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International law prescribes rules for states on a wide variety of mat-
ters. Some rules may limit states' discretion on constitutional ques-
tions; for example, constitutions must be consistent with international
human rights law. But international law has been widely understood
to leave to each state how its government is to be structured and its
constitution revised. Recent developments challenge this division.
Increasingly there are signs of emerging international legal norms
addressing matters such as the separation of powers and constitu-
tional amendment. This article describes these developments and
their background, evaluates their application to constitutional crises
in Nicaragua and Togo, and discusses their relevance for U.S. consti-
tutional law, including limits on executive power. Situating these
developments in the context of other international constraints on
states, the article concludes that while the apparent movement
toward treating constitutional structure and revision as proper sub-
jects of international law may be unavoidable, the trend carries sig-
nificant risks to democracy as well as possible benefits for it.
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INTRODUCTION
Ordinary constitutional practice has its own familiar vocabulary.
Constitutions are drafted, applied, interpreted, or amended; they are
affirmed, reshaped, or revised. They are understood in light of a chang-
ing (or unchanging) social consensus; construed according to the fram-
ers' intent; or read in keeping with structural or functional
considerations.
A less familiar vocabulary highlights seemingly exceptional cir-
cumstances. Constitutions can be broken, disrupted, or cast aside. They
can be suspended-or "ripped to shreds"-by a president intent on pre-
serving his own power.' They might even be amended by referendum to
effect a virtual coup d'6tat.2
The notion that a constitution may be broken rests on two premises.
First, there are characteristics so fundamental to a given constitutional
order that changing them would disrupt it. Second, changes to a consti-
tution are illegitimate if they do not conform to some set of rules or
requirements-procedural, substantive, or both-governing changes.
An irregular alteration of the constitution that seriously impaired some
basic characteristic would surely constitute a breakdown in the constitu-
tional order.
The real difficulty, of course, lies in determining when such a
breakdown has occurred in particular circumstances. For any given con-
stitution-or perhaps for any constitution as such-many characteristics
or provisions might plausibly qualify as fundamental: some limit on
executive power, some set of basic rights and freedoms, or an indepen-
dent judiciary, to name a few possibilities. Unfortunately, constitutional
texts do not themselves necessarily specify these characteristics in full,
if at all. In any event, whether a constitution could itself determine what
aspects are fundamental is likely to be no less controversial than whether
a constitution could prescribe the appropriate method of interpreting it.
Beyond these quandaries lies the inevitable uncertainty over whether
any particular interpretation or action is in fact inconsistent with the fun-
1. See David Rohde, Pakistani Sets Emergency Rule, Defying the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4,
2007, at AI; see also Emily Wax, In the Heart of Pakistan, a Deep Sense of Anxiety, WASH. POST,
Nov. 7, 2007, at A01 (quoting ousted chief justice of Supreme Court as saying that Pakistan's
constitution had been "ripped to shreds").
2. This charge was made by President Hugo Chivez's former defense minister Radl Isafas
Baduel, who characterized sweeping constitutional amendments that ChAvez's government had
put to a referendum as a "coup d'etat." Andres Oppenheimer, Vote May Turn Venezuela into
'Elected Dictatorship,' MIAMIHERALD.COM, Nov. 29, 2007, http://www.miamiherald.com/news/
columnists/andres-oppenheimer/story/324829.html. The amendments were defeated in the
referendum. See Juan Forero, Venezuelans Deny Chdvez Additional Authority; President
Concedes Defeat in 51-49 Vote, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2007, at A01.
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damental characteristic. 3
As for constitutional revisions, here, too, the difficulties are great.
The text of a constitution may not exhaustively describe the proper
means for revising it. Perhaps it does not even include everything that
might be deemed a part of the constitution.4 Any procedural and sub-
stantive limits a constitution does place on changes may not necessarily
be binding simply because they were set out in the text. Even deciding
whether a constitution has been amended may not be simple, given the
multitude of ways in which a constitution can be reshaped and modified
over time apart from formal processes.
However elusive resolution of these questions about constitutional
rupture may be, broad assertions about the scope of executive authority
since September 11 have made them highly pertinent in the U.S. context.
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Justice O'Connor described fundamental consti-
tutional values as being "severely tested"5 by the "temptation to dis-
pense with fundamental constitutional guarantees."6  Dissenting in
Rumsfeld v. Padilla,7 Justice Stevens remarked that "[a]t stake in this
case is nothing less than the essence of a free society," with the prospect
of "[e]xecutive detention of subversive citizens" creating the specter of
the "Star Chamber."
Few if any judges grappling with questions of executive authority
3. Indeed, it may even be difficult to tell if what has been broken or interrupted is a
constitution in a meaningful sense. To take one example, President Musharraf was widely said to
have suspended Pakistan's constitution in November 2007. See, e.g., Rohde, supra note 1; Griff
Witte, Musharraf Declares Emergency Rule in Pakistan; Constitution Suspended; Chief Judge
Fired, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2007, at A01; cf. Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf, Text
of Pakistan Emergency Declaration (Nov. 3, 2007), in BBC NEws, Nov. 3, 2007, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/southasia/7077136.stm (referring to decision that constitution "shall
remain in abeyance"). Yet he took power through a military coup in 1999 and subsequently
promulgated major changes to Pakistan's constitution that greatly expanded his presidential
powers. See Osama Siddique, The Jurisprudence of Dissolutions: Presidential Power To Dissolve
Assemblies Under the Pakistani Constitution and Its Discontents, 23 ARIZ. J. Ib.r'L & COMp. L.
615, 622, 700 (2006). This history might suggest that it makes no sense to treat the document as a
genuine constitution; the opposition of many Pakistani lawyers to Musharraf's order might equally
imply otherwise. See Griff Witte, Lawyers Take on Musharraf; Thousands Demonstrate in Cities
Across Pakistan, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2007, at A01.
4. See Matthew S. R. Palmer, Using Constitutional Realism To Identify the Complete
Constitution: Lessons from an Unwritten Constitution, 54 AM. J. COMp. L. 587 (2006); Ernest A.
Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408 (2007); cf. 1 BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 59 (1991) (referring to the "constitutional regime, the
matrix of institutional relationships and fundamental values that are usually taken as the
constitutional baseline in normal political life").
5. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 532 (2004) (O'Connor, J., announcing the judgment of
the Court).
6. Id. (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 165 (1963)).
7. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
8. Id. at 465 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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have given more trenchant expression to this sense of potential break-
down than Judge Diana Gribbon Motz. Writing for a panel of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (in a case the Fourth Circuit
subsequently decided to hear en banc),9 she rejected the President's
claim of "inherent constitutional authority" to seize a civilian within the
United States as an enemy combatant and detain him or her indefi-
nitely.t Accepting that claim, she wrote, would "alter the constitutional
foundations of our Republic,"" with "disastrous consequences for the
Constitution-and the country."' 2  This language seems to reflect a
sense that something more than ordinary constitutional interpretation is
at stake in at least some of the issues raised by broad assertions of exec-
utive power: Incorrect resolution of some constitutional questions might
lead "the government itself to go to pieces."' 3
What I want to analyze here is not the correct resolution of the
many issues regarding executive power raised since September 11, but
an unspoken assumption that courts facing what they regard as highly
fraught constitutional determinations typically make. This assumption
concerns the relevance of international law to what I will call "structural
constitutional issues"-issues such as the allocation of powers within
the government and fidelity to the constitution.' 4 The largely unspoken
premise is that these issues are to be analyzed and decided as purely
domestic matters, and that international law has nothing to say about the
separation of powers or the process of constitutional amendment.
15
9. AI-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2007), reh'g en banc granted, No. 06-7427
(4th Cir. argued Oct. 31, 2007); see also Tom Campbell, Enemy-Combatant Case Returns to U.S.
Appeals Court, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Nov. 1, 2007, at A-7.
10. 487 F.3d at 189-95.
11. Id. at 195.
12. Id.
13. Id. (quoting Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in
ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRrs 1859-1865, at 246, 254 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed.,
1989)).
14. The question of what the "allocation of powers" or the "separation of powers"
encompasses is itself an important and complex one. See generally Bruce Ackerman, The New
Separation of Powers, 113 HAv. L. REv. 633 (2000). As will be evident, the emerging norms
certainly encompass what is most traditionally thought to be the subject of separation of powers-
such as the independence of the judiciary and the balance of power between executive and
legislative branches. But they are consistent with a broader conception of the separation of
powers that considers, for example, the degree of independence of the administrative branch of
government or the role of political parties. By "fidelity to the constitution," I refer not only to
adherence to the constitution at any given time, but also the rules governing the processes by
which it is revised-such as formal amendment, reinterpretation, and glosses added over time by
commonly accepted practices.
15. Even one recent effort to link international human rights treaties to structural
considerations reflects this premise as well. See David Sloss, Using International Law To
Enhance Democracy, 47 VA. J. IrN'L L. 1 (2006). Noting that treaty-based rulings are subject to
congressional override as a matter of domestic law, whereas constitutional rulings can be
[Vol. 62:417
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To assert this as a premise is not to claim that the courts utterly
deny the relevance of international law when deciding questions like the
President's power to seize civilians at will. The Supreme Court has
treated international humanitarian law as a potential constraint on (or
source of authority for) the government as a whole-a constraint that
takes the form of individual rights. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 6 for exam-
ple, the plurality ruled that "[t]here is no bar to this Nation's holding one
of its own citizens as an enemy combatant."' 7 In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
the Court ruled that Congress had mandated compliance with Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions in the creation of tribunals to try
enemy combatants. 8
International legal limitations on government power-or even,
more controversially, obligations on the government to take action--do
not necessarily specify which parts of the government are constrained or
required to act. Indeed, international law generally leaves that to each
state. Typical in this regard is the question of the right to participate in
public affairs. Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights guarantees each citizen the opportunity to "take part in
the conduct of public affairs," 9 to "vote and to be elected, '20 and to
"have access... to public service. 21 The U.N. Human Rights Commit-
tee (charged with overseeing implementation of the Covenant) interprets
Article 25 strictly as a right of the citizen vis-A-vis the government as a
whole. That is, while the right "covers all aspects of public administra-
tion, and the formulation and implementation of policy at international,
national, regional and local levels," the Committee reads Article 25 to
say nothing about the internal structure of the government, leaving that
to be determined by each country's "constitution and other laws. '"22
overridden only by amendment or subsequent overruling, Sloss argues that making human rights
treaties self-executing would enhance democracy. See id. at 8 ("By encouraging direct application
of treaties as a substitute for constitutional decision-making, the legislation would enhance
Congress' role in the decision-making process, because Congress would retain the power to
change the law if it was dissatisfied with the results of judicial decisions."). Still, the argument
assumes that international law norms address individual rights, as opposed to the structure of
government. See id. at 29 (referring to allocation of authority to decide "the scope and content of
legal protection afforded for fundamental human rights").
16. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
17. Id. at 519 (emphasis added).
18. 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2802 (2006); see also Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. The other three Geneva
Conventions of 1949 contain the same obligation.
19. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 25(a), Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
20. Id. art. 25(b).
21. Id. art. 25(c).
22. U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Human Rights Comm., GENERAL COMMENT 25
(57), GENERAL COMMENTS UNDER ARTICLE 40, PARAGRAPH 4, OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT
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Moreover, in at least two important senses international law itself
proclaims the irrelevance of constitutional law. As the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law notes, under international law states
are bound by their international legal obligations regardless of what their
domestic law may provide. Thus, "[a] state cannot adduce its constitu-
tion or its laws as a defense for failure to carry out its international
obligation. 23 If a federal state took on an international obligation in a
subject matter reserved under the state's constitution to constituent units,
it might find itself in a bind if a constituent unit violated the obligation
and the national government lacked the power to override the constituent
unit's action. Nevertheless, the state would still be responsible under
international law.24 The same would be true if the constitutional alloca-
tion of power among branches of government within a unitary state, or
at the national level in a federal state, precluded it from fulfilling an
obligation. A state's desire to adhere to its own constitution is, in this
sense, a matter of indifference to international law. It is not important
whether the state breaches, amends, or reinterprets its own constitution
in order to give itself the ability to fulfill its international obligations;
what is important is that it perform its international legal obligations.
The obverse of states' inability to plead their own constitutional
and other domestic law as a basis for violating international law is the
wide degree of discretion that states enjoy in choosing the internal gov-
ernmental processes by which they fulfill obligations they take on by
treaty. In some states, a treaty is more or less automatically incorporated
into domestic law; in other states, an act of the legislature is required for
ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, 5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/2I/Rev.I/Add.7 (Dec. 7, 1996),
available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/gencomn/hrcom25.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2008);
see also id. ("The allocation of powers and the means by which individual citizens exercise the
right to participate in the conduct of public affairs protected by article 25 should be established by
the constitution and other laws.").
23. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 155
cmt. b (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]; see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art.
27, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 ("A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law
as justification for its failure to perform a treaty."). See generally IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 34-35 (6th ed. 2003). The principle sometimes arises in related
contexts. For example, Finland and Portugal both objected to a reservation to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights taken by the United States. That reservation stated that the
United States was bound by Article 7 (prohibiting "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment") only to the extent that that prohibition coincided with the U.S. Constitution's ban on
cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. 138 CONG. REc. S4781-01, S4783 (daily ed. Apr. 2,
1992). Finland objected that under the law of treaties, "a party may not invoke the provisions of
its internal law as justification for failure to perform a treaty." International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, Objections, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/
docs/ObjectionslCCPR.pdf. Portugal objected for similar reasons. Id. ("[I]nvoking general
principles of National Law may ... contribute to undermining the basis of International Law.").
24. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 23, § 321 cmt. b.
[Vol. 62:417
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the treaty to have effect as part of domestic law.25 The "fundamental
principle," as one commentator puts it, "is that the application of treaties
is governed by domestic constitutional law."26 In addition, states may
choose to put certain international law issues beyond the reach of courts
through doctrines of justiciability. 27 These choices have obvious impli-
cations for the internal balance of powers among the executive, legisla-
tive, and judicial branches, and they are essentially left to each state to
determine.
In short, international law might seem most naturally to place obli-
gations on states, but to leave structures of government and adherence to
the constitution entirely on the domestic plane. This approach, in turn,
would lend a great deal of plausibility to the unspoken premise of the
irrelevance of international law to structural constitutional questions.
Indeed, it might raise the question whether the premise is even worth
articulating. Some assumptions, after all, are left unspoken because they
are so reasonable. Is this one such premise? Before answering this
question, it may be useful to dwell briefly on what it might mean for
international law to govern structural constitutional matters. It may also
be useful to point out that the prospect of such an undertaking is not
entirely without precedent in our own constitutional tradition.
As for what it might mean, suppose the President wished to take an
action that would not in itself violate a human right or other interna-
tional legal constraint on government action. Suppose, further, that the
Constitution recognized executive power to take the action without con-
gressional authorization (or even in the face of congressional disap-
proval). Even so, the Constitution would not necessarily require the
executive to take that action; it simply would not disable the President
from acting. Might there be international law norms concerning execu-
tive power or the maintenance of checks and balances, however, that
could make it a violation of international law for the President to exer-
cise the authority left open by the Constitution? One might take it even
further. Where international norms relating to executive power some-
how conflicted with the Constitution-say, by requiring legislative
approval for an action over which the Constitution granted the President
exclusive authority-we would expect domestic courts to follow the
Constitution. But might the international norms provide a legitimate
basis for criticism by other countries or international bodies of the way
in which powers were allocated within the federal government?
25. See BROWNLIE, supra note 23, at 40-48.
26. Francis G. Jacobs, Introduction, in 7 THE EFpcr OF TREATIES IN DOMESTIC LAW XXiii,
xxiv (Francis G. Jacobs & Shelley Roberts eds., 1987).
27. See BROWNLIE, supra note 23, at 49-50 (discussing "relation of executive and judiciary
and issues of non-justiciability").
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Second, let us assume for the sake of argument that the U.S. Con-
stitution places no constraints on amendment beyond those set out in
Article V. Article V prescribes procedures for adoption of amendments
and bans use of the amendment power to deprive a state of its equal
representation in the Senate.28 Suppose, then, that an amendment strip-
ping Congress of most of its powers and handing them over to the Presi-
dent would be valid as long as it was adopted in conformity with the
procedures set out in Article V. Once again, the absence of constitu-
tional norms ruling out this conclusion would not necessarily be suffi-
cient for the full validity of the amendment if international law imposed
certain binding constraints on the amendment of constitutions that ruled
out a change of this sort. Here, too, even if we might reasonably predict
that U.S. courts would follow domestic rather than international law in
case of a perceived conflict or difference, there might seem to be a legit-
imate basis for criticism by other states or international bodies as to how
the matter was handled.
The idea that international law might bear on questions of separa-
tion of powers and amendment of constitutions may not seem wise at
first glance. Simply as a matter of description, constitutions are very
much tied up with each country's particular history and establish a wide
range of different governmental structures. Their meanings are heavily
influenced by the particular practices of judicial interpretation associated
with them.29 Any comparative examination of different countries' con-
stitutions and governmental structures makes clear how wide is the
scope for variation.3" The very conception of the role of a constitution
in the life of a nation may not be the same for all countries.3 ' Thus,
achieving even the degree of concreteness manifested in the language of
human rights treaties (which are themselves typically phrased in rather
broad language) might be difficult.
It might also be undemocratic. If the U.S. Constitution is, as
Corwin put it, an "invitation to struggle"-a characterization he applied
28. U.S. CONST. art. V.
29. For a useful discussion in a comparative context, see David Robertson, Thick
Constitutional Readings: When Classic Distinctions Are Irrelevant, 35 GA. J. iNT'L & COMP. L.
277 (2007).
30. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 14. See generally Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of
Federalism: Of Continuities and Comparative Constitutional Experience, 51 DuKE L.J. 223
(2001) (discussing the use of comparative constitutional law in U.S. federalism decisions); Jenny
S. Martinez, Inherent Executive Power: A Comparative Perspective, 115 YALE L.J. 2480 (2006)
(comparing executive power in five democracies).
31. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Commentary, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1971, 1991-99 (2004) (contrasting constitution as embodiment of self-government with
constitution as embodiment of universal rights-based constraints on government, and identifying
the former with the United States and the latter with Europe).
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to the Constitution's allocation of foreign affairs powers between Con-
gress and the President, but which could be applied to many parts of
many constitutions-perhaps it is most consistent with democratic gov-
ernance that the struggle be resolved by elected actors and their constitu-
ents within each state.32 The relatively broad language of many other
countries' constitutions and their amenability to changing interpretations
over time might suggest similar concerns in those cases. This concern is
all the more pointed because the institutional struggles always take place
within the context of struggles over policy directions and profoundly
influence those struggles.33 Perhaps, as well, the fundamental rules gov-
erning the creation and amendment-the two are not always easy to dis-
tinguish-of a nation's basic legal text should be left to each state to
decide. All of these concerns are magnified by the fact that neither
international institutions nor other states are subject to any accountabil-
ity to a given national electorate.
These concerns are real, and not easily dismissed. But the same
may be said of the emerging signs of international law norms addressing
structures of government and fidelity to the constitution. In their most
currently developed form, these emerging norms have been propounded
or suggested by regional international organizations, but they may also
presage a more global trend.
The trend, moreover, is well worth examining. On the one hand, as
noted, there are valid bases for concern about whether such norms could
ever move from away from a breadth capable of encompassing a wide
variety of constitutional arrangements-a breadth purchased at the cost
of any hope of meaningful practical application-without also imposing
a straitjacket on democratic choice of the forms of government. On the
other hand, the protection of human rights does constitute a legitimate
concern of international law, and while democracies can certainly vio-
late human rights, it is not implausible to suppose that the prospects for
holding a government to account are greater in a democracy than in a
dictatorship. If maintenance of democracy is therefore a plausible con-
cern for international law, it is no longer obvious that the structure of
any state's government and its respect for its own constitution are purely
domestic concerns. For while there are undoubtedly many ways of
32. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1984, at 201 (5th rev.
ed. 1984) ("[T]he Constitution, considered only for its affirmative grants of powers capable of
affecting the issue, is an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign
policy.").
33. Corwin himself linked the overall trend of the struggle in favor of the presidency during
the twentieth century to a substantive policy choice the nation made in replacing "the laissez-faire
theory of government with the idea that government should make itself an active, reforming force
in the field of economic enterprise." Id. at 357.
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structuring democratic governance, the thought that some allocations of
powers or approaches to constitutional fidelity might be incompatible
with democracy is at least worth taking seriously.
The legitimacy and practicality of this trend can be neither con-
demned nor vindicated solely by reference to any one country's law. In
that sense, it is neither here nor there that the idea that international law
bears on these questions is not entirely without support in our own con-
stitutional tradition. But it may make the idea seem less foreign.
I am not referring here to the Supreme Court's practice of some-
times taking the experience of other countries or systems into account
when deciding constitutional questions. In his dissent in Printz v.
United States,34 for example, Justice Breyer used a comparative analysis
to argue that a power on the part of the central government to order
constituent units to carry out federal regulations is compatible with a
federal structure of government. A comparative analysis is not the same
as application of international law; in any event, Justice Breyer was
careful to make clear that he invoked comparative constitutional law
solely to help "interpret[ ] our own Constitution."35 Of course, more
ambitious conceptions of international human rights law might see it
moving toward convergence with some kind of transnational constitu-
tional law, creating a new global constitutional order in which "[t]he
sense of distinctive sovereignties is diminished, as is the strong distinc-
tion between domestic constitutional law and international legal norms
in areas of human rights."36 The Court, however, has not taken this
approach.
Nor am I referring to Chief Justice Marshall's well-known admoni-
tion in Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy that "an act of Congress
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other
possible construction remains. ' 37 This admonition may bear on consti-
tutional interpretation as well, particularly if the concern is to avoid
placing the United States in breach of its international law obligations,38
34. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
35. Id. at 977 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
36. Vicki C. Jackson, Transnational Discourse, Relational Authority, and the U.S. Court:
Gender Equality, 37 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 271, 309 (2003); see also Lorraine E. Weinrib,
Constitutional Conceptions and Constitutional Comparativism, in DEFINING THE FIELD OF
COMPARATIVE CONSTrUTIONAL LAW 3, 21, 22-23 (Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet eds., 2002)
(an emerging transnational constitutionalism may "dictate[ ] certain institutional arrangements
and, in particular, a special mode of judicial analysis").
37. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
38. In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 & n.8 (1976), the Supreme Court took the U.N.
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners into account to help determine rights
under the due process and cruel and unusual punishment provisions of the Constitution. Cf. Roper
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005) (interpreting the Eighth Amendment to be consistent
with international law prohibiting execution of juvenile offenders). Roper did not hold that
[Vol. 62:417
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though its application to constitutional interpretation is not without con-
troversy.39 In any event, an interpretive guide or influence is not the
same as a binding authority.4 °
Rather, I have in mind the way that glimpses of the potential rele-
vance of international law to structural constitutional issues can be found
in both the Court's case law and positions taken by the executive. I call
them "glimpses" because they amount to less than a well-worked doc-
trine. Indeed, they are subject to alternative interpretations that keep
structural constitutional issues firmly within the domestic arena. But
they also provide a window on the way even a constitutional practice
that is as domestically oriented as ours can partially acknowledge the
relevance of international law.
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.' is best known for its
vigorous conception of executive power in foreign affairs. There the
Court stated that sovereignty passed directly from Great Britain to the
United States upon independence, and ruled that "the investment of the
federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did not
depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution. '"42 In other
words, it was the international legal rules governing the community that
the United States joined upon independence that gave the federal gov-
ernment these powers. The Court held, as well, that in the realm of
foreign affairs, "the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a
representative of the nation."43
It is worth dwelling on Curtiss-Wright's implications for a moment.
The Court in effect identified an essential element of our internal gov-
ernmental structure and traced it to a source other than the Constitution:
international law. The element was essential because, in the Court's
view, "[s]overeignty is never held in suspense. ' 4 The moment the
execution would violate the United States' obligations, and the practice of other countries played
at least as great a role as international law. See id. at 578. But international law was relevant at
least indirectly as an expression of the view of most countries regarding the legality of executing
juveniles. See id.
39. See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, Foreign Relations as a Matter of Interpretation: The Use and
Abuse of Charming Betsy, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1339, 1341-42 (2006); see also David T. Hutt & Lisa
K. Parshall, Divergent Views on the Use of International and Foreign Law: Congress and the
Executive Versus the Court, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 113, 124-40 (2007) (describing congressional
and executive hostility to the use of international and foreign law in constitutional interpretation).
40. For an interesting discussion that highlights the potential for a strong version of the
Charming Betsy approach to internationalizing constitutional law, see Melissa A. Waters,
Creeping Monism: The Judicial Trend Toward Interpretive Incorporation of Human Rights
Treaties, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 679-86 (2007).
41. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
42. Id. at 318.
43. Id. at 319.
44. Id. at 317.
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United States became independent, the government acquired certain
powers without regard to the silence of the Articles of Confederation or
(later) the Constitution regarding them; to say otherwise, the Court
remarked, would be to assert that "the United States is not completely
sovereign."45
The force of the Court's language attributing the foreign affairs
powers to the President might even raise questions about constitutional
amendments limiting executive power. Only the executive, the Court
said, is suited to exercising the powers that international law gives the
federal government; and effective membership in the international com-
munity requires the President to exercise these powers exclusively.46 If
that is so, could an amendment taking important parts of those powers
from the President and giving them to Congress be any more legitimate
than an amendment reducing the Senate representation of the smallest
states to one member each? The idea that the rules governing amend-
ments might not be exhaustively stated in Article V has received schol-
arly attention in recent years.47 Perhaps international law might
constitute another source of rules governing fidelity to the Constitu-
tion-one that is not only outside Article V (or at least the text of Article
V), but outside the Constitution itself.
There is no doubt that these readings take the role of international
law further than the Court would do. Curtiss-Wright itself was careful
to note that the plenary power the President was said to enjoy "must be
exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitu-
tion."'48 Even in Ex Parte Quirin, the Court made the cautionary point
that "Congress and the President, like the courts, possess no power not
derived from the Constitution."49  And of course, Curtiss-Wright's
account of history has been heavily criticized.5"
45. Id. at 318.
46. Id. at 319-22.
47. See, e.g., Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, An Unconstitutional Constitution? A Comparative
Perspective, 4 INT'L J. CONST. L. 460, 461 (2006) (discussing substantive limits on permissible
constitutional amendments); Jeff Rosen, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitutional?,
100 YALE L.J. 1073, 1086 (1991) ("[R]etained natural rights are an implicit limitation on
amendments inside or outside of Article V."); cf Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed:
Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. Rav. 457, 458 (1994) (discussing the
possibility of formal amendments outside the Article V procedure).
48. 299 U.S. at 320; see also Medellfn v. Texas, No. 06-984, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 2912, at *59
(Mar. 25, 2008) (same).
49. 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942); cf. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2823 (2006) (Thomas,
J., dissenting) ("Congress, to be sure, has a substantial and essential role in both foreign affairs
and national security.").
50. See, e.g., David M. Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice
Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467, 489 (1946) (account of sovereignty "does not harmonize
with the facts"); id. at 493 ("extreme interpretation" of the constitution incompatible with
democracy); Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An
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Still, if one were to find in the Constitution an inherent executive
power to undertake actions the scope of which is defined by interna-
tional law, the President would have powers not too different from those
derived from the most ambitious reading of Curtiss-Wright. There are
intimations of just such an approach on the government's part in the
cases concerning the President's power to capture, detain, and try enemy
combatants. In Hamdi, the government argued that the President's war
powers did not depend on congressional authority, at least in cases
where the United States was attacked: The President, in this view, has
inherent authority under the Constitution as commander in chief to cap-
ture and detain enemy combatants to the full extent that the law of war
permits.51 In Hamdan, the government argued that the President had
inherent authority as commander in chief to establish military commis-
sions to try individuals "who violated the law of war."' 52 The phrase
"law of war" may refer in part to U.S. rules that have evolved in the
course of fighting, but it at least includes international rules developed
through treaty and customary law processes.53 While this position ulti-
mately grounds the President's authority in the Constitution, as a practi-
cal matter it traces the scope of that power to international law. Because
any recognition of inherent executive authority affects the President's
position vis-A-vis Congress, the government's position amounts to deter-
mining the allocation of power, at least in part, by international law.5 4
If nothing else, both Curtiss-Wright and the government's position
in Hamdi and Hamdan make clear that introducing international law into
structural constitutional issues is not necessarily synonymous with
Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1, 28-32 (1973) (Court's historical account inaccurate).
Nor does its account of sovereignty being transferred directly to the United States as a whole
square easily with characterizations by the Court in other contexts of the states as having
surrendered sovereignty in ratifying the Constitution. E.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,
514 U.S. 779, 803 (1995); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 574 (1964).
51. Brief for the Respondents at 12-21, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-
6696); see also Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2825 n.2 (suggesting that the President has "inherent
authority to try unlawful combatants for violations of the law of war before military
commissions"); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 542 (Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring in part, dissenting in
part, and concurring in the judgment) (noting the government's argument that the President's
Article II role as commander in chief brings with it "authority under the accepted customary rules
for waging war").
52. Brief for Respondents at 16, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-184)
(quoting Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 208 (1949) (Douglas, J., concurring)).
53. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2829 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The common law of war as it
pertains to offenses triable by military commission is derived from the experience of our wars and
our wartime tribunals and the laws and usages of war as understood and practiced by the civilized
nations of the world.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
54. The Court did not rule one way or the other on the government's position in Hamdi
because it found that the power to capture and detain enemy combatants on the battlefield in
Afghanistan was implicit in Congress's post-September 11 authorization of the use of military
force. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518.
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developing new sources of restraint on executive power or even rein-
forcing existing domestic constraints. The government's appeal to the
law of war also shows how it may be particularly tempting in the right
circumstances for presidents to appeal to international law as an expan-
sive source of authority. In this respect, the Bush administration's
approach bears some resemblance to an appeal by the Nicaraguan presi-
dent to international standards in 2004 to 2005 as he sought to prevent
his powers from being limited by constitutional amendments.
One can also see in the Court's post-September 11 cases glimpses
of a very different role for international law in structural constitutional
issues, one that focuses on judicial independence. In Hamdan the Court
determined that the military commissions the President had created
could be upheld only if they complied with the requirements of Com-
mon Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, because the Uniform Code of
Military Justice ("UCMJ") required conformity not only with the UCMJ
itself and the "American common law of war,"56 but also with interna-
tional humanitarian law. Common Article 3 prohibits the "passing of
sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment
pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples.""
Both the plurality and Justice Kennedy's opinions read Common
Article 3 to impose two basic requirements. One was, in effect, fidelity
to the state's own constitution. The Court agreed with the Red Cross
commentary that "regularly constituted" means "established and organ-
ized in accordance with the laws and procedures already in force in a
country."58 The Court interpreted this requirement to mandate conform-
ity as far as practicable with the congressionally established military jus-
tice system.59 But Common Article 3 also functioned in practice as a
requirement of constitutional fidelity; the reason that the deviations from
the UMCJ by the rules and procedures governing the military commis-
sions were fatal was that the Constitution (as read by the Court) made
the congressionally approved system binding on the executive. Tribu-
nals established by an exercise of executive power that violated constitu-
tional constraints on that power could hardly be "regularly constituted."
The other requirement is, potentially, an international separation of
55. See infra Part H.A.
56. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2786.
57. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3(l)(d), Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
58. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2797 (quoting Ir'L COMM. OF RED CROSS, 1 CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 355 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
59. Id.; see also id. at 2804 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
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powers standard. Both the plurality and Justice Kennedy took note of
the fact that, as the plurality put it, the "rules and procedures [of the
military commissions] are subject to change midtrial, at the whim of the
Executive."6 The plurality seemed to fault this provision mainly for its
deviation from the UCMJ, though its reference to the "whim of the
Executive" implicitly suggests separation of powers concerns. Justice
Kennedy made these concerns explicit, noting that Common Article 3
requires "an acceptable degree of independence [on the part of the tribu-
nal] from the Executive."' 6' The military commissions suffered from a
number of structural defects that concentrated power in the executive
and undermined their independence from the executive branch. 62
Because judicial independence is easily understood as an important
aspect of the separation of powers, Justice Kennedy's interpretation
effectively amounts to a recognition of a particular separation of powers
requirement mandated by international law.6 3
It would not be hard to exaggerate the significance of these
glimpses of a role for international law in structural constitutional ques-
tions. Even Hamdan, with its extensive and necessary discussion of
international law, is ultimately read most straightforwardly as a holding
based on the U.S. constitutional requirements of the separation of pow-
ers: To create the kind of military commissions he had established, the
President would at least need approval by Congress. 6'
In this article I would like to explore what it would mean to imag-
ine a world in which the President's claims of inherent authority to
detain civilians might be tested against, for example, the provisions of
the Inter-American Democratic Charter, adopted by the Organization of
American States in 2001. The Charter pronounces maintenance of "the
rule of law" and "the separation of powers and independence of the
branches of government" essential to any democracy, and prohibits any
''unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime that seriously
60. Id. at 2797 n.65 (majority opinion); see also id. at 2804 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
61. Id. at 2804 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
62. Id. at 2807.
63. To be sure, in Justice Kennedy's view it was up to Congress to determine in the first
instance what it would take to achieve that "acceptable degree of independence from the
Executive." Id. at 2804. Congress, in his view, had done so through the UCMJ. Thus, he
conducted his analysis of whether the procedures governing the military commissions complied
with Common Article 3 by means of a careful comparison of those procedures to the UCMJ and
regulations under it. See id. at 2804-08; see also id. at 2084 (referring to "the standards of our
Nation's system of justice"). But the essential question was still the same: Did the tribunals have
the independence mandated by Common Article 3?
64. I say "at least" because Hamdan left open the possibility that even with congressional
approval some procedures-for example, not permitting the accused to be present during the
proceedings-might violate individual rights. See id. at 2808-09.
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impairs the democratic order in a member state. 65
The Charter was adopted on September 11, 2001, shortly after the
attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.66 The timing was
coincidental. The Charter had been under development and considera-
tion for a long period before September 11. Indeed, in some respects it
represents the culmination of the first foray into the area by the Organi-
zation of American States ("OAS") in 1991, with the Santiago Commit-
ment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American System,
which committed the OAS to oppose military coups. But it is striking
that the most comprehensive attempt to internationalize the separation of
powers and adherence to the Charter was adopted on the same day as the
events that have been the occasion in recent years for dramatic asser-
tions of executive power that, if accepted, could reshape the U.S.
Constitution.
To imagine a world in which the constitutional questions and the
international norms were intertwined by more than the coincidence of a
date is not necessarily to seek its creation. Indeed, I do not aim to pro-
vide a definitive judgment as the desirability of these emerging norms.
Rather, I seek to accomplish three aims. First, in Part I, I will set out the
indications that separation of powers and fidelity to the constitution are
moving toward becoming subjects of international concern. As the
description will make clear, there is some ground for arguing that there
currently are binding rules of global international law governing these
subjects-and even more evidence of fairly strongly stated regional
norms, together with some reason to think they might become more
global.
Second, in Part II, I will recount and analyze the way in these
emerging norms have been applied in two countries' constitutional cri-
ses-Nicaragua and Togo. The focus of this part on action by regional
and international actors is deliberate; I do not intend to address the ques-
tion of the role these emerging norms might play in domestic courts'
resolution of constitutional questions. Instead, the analysis will high-
light how quickly such norms-no matter how broadly phrased-draw
international actors into detailed analyses of other countries' constitu-
tions. That these two countries are decidedly not powerful actors on the
international scene gives some indication of the concern these emerging
norms may raise: Will they simply legitimize a new basis for more pow-
erful countries to intervene in the affairs of the less powerful?
65. Organization of American States, Inter-American Democratic Charter art. 19, Sept. 11,
2001, 40 I.L.M. 1289 (2001) [hereinafter Inter-American Democratic Charter].
66. See Abraham Lama & Federico Ferber, Rallying Behind Democracy in Face of
Terrorism, IPS-INTER-PRESS SERV., Sept. 11, 2001.
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Finally, in Part HI, I will briefly attempt to situate these emerging
norms within a broader international context. There are already, as I
will point out, many aspects of international law that influence and bear
on structural questions and adherence to constitutions, even though they
do not, by their own terms, address constitutional law. At the very least,
this fact raises the question whether defending the purely domestic
nature of constitutional questions may simply divert attention from a
variety of formal and informal ways in which they are being internation-
alized, at least in part.
I. THE EMERGING INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS REGARDING
STRUCTURAL CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
A. Antecedents
As noted earlier,67 with respect to compliance the basic approach of
international law toward domestic law is studied indifference to the lat-
ter: A state may not cite its own domestic law (including its constitu-
tional law) to justify violating an international law norm. But there is an
exception. Under Article 46 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, a state may cite violation of its own domestic law limitations
regarding capacity to consent to a treaty as a basis for invalidating its
consent.68 The state may invoke these limitations only if the violation is
"manifest" and "concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental
importance. '69 Because these limitations are typically (though not nec-
essarily) embodied in its constitutional law, this issue is one area where
international law and constitutional law intersect.
The intersection poses a dilemma. Allowing a state to rely on its
internal law in this area not only is inconsistent with the general rule
holding a state to its treaty obligations regardless of its domestic law, but
also might undermine the interests of other parties to the treaty. Yet the
prospect that a state could be deemed a party to a treaty even though the
fundamental instrument structuring and legitimizing the state's exis-
tence-its constitution-had been violated in the process of becoming a
party hardly seems consistent with the idea that state parties are bound to
treaties because they have consented to them.
The rule ultimately adopted in the Vienna Convention does make
reference to constitutional law (that is, to violations of "internal law of
fundamental importance") but in a fairly restrictive way. The violation
of the internal law must have been "manifest," and the law that was
67. See supra text accompanying notes 23-27.
68. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 23, art. 46(1).
69. Id.
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violated must have been of "fundamental importance." The former
requirement is essentially a question of objective notice.70 More inter-
esting is the requirement that the rule be of "fundamental importance."
If that requirement is judged by an international standard, then it could
effectively involve an international determination of which parts of a
state's constitution are "fundamental" and which are not. Yet what is
fundamental to a constitution is obviously also a matter of domestic con-
stitutional law.
While it may not provide a definitive guide to interpreting Article
46, 7' the discussion of this provision at the United Nations Conference
on the Law of Treaties in 1968 and 1969 sheds interesting light on the
quandaries posed by this exception. At the Forty-Third Meeting of the
Committee of the Whole in 1968, the Iranian delegate proposed that
international law should flatly recognize that a head of state could bind a
state through a treaty. This, he asserted, was what "the great majority of
constitutions" provide, and it would be preferable to importing vague
terms like "manifest" and "fundamental" into treaty law.72 The Polish
delegate replied, in effect, that the Iranian proposal would unacceptably
commit international law to executive power by "suggest[ing] that a
Head of State could never [be deemed to] act in contravention of the
constitution of the State." This approach, he added, would overlook
cases in the past cited by the International Law Commission in which "a
Head of State had concluded a treaty in contravention of an unequivocal
provision of the constitution. 73
Also the subject of discussion was whether one state could produc-
tively interpret another state's constitution in order to tell whether the
other state's government was in fact adhering to provisions in its consti-
tution concerning capacity to consent to treaties. The delegate from
Pakistan expressed the concern that it would be "difficult to expect one
contracting party to know in detail the constitutional provisions of
another State regarding capacity to express its consent to be bound by a
treaty."' 74 The delegate from Venezuela replied that the United Nations
published collections of member states' written. constitutions, so it
70. Report of the International Law Commission to the Attorney General, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l
L. Comm'n 169, 242, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1 [hereinafter International Law
Commission Report] (violation is "manifest" if it "would be objectively evident to any State
dealing with the matter normally and in good faith").
71. The Vienna Convention relegates the travaux preparatoires to a secondary status in
interpretation. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 23, art. 32.
72. United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, G.A. Res. 2166 (XXI), 20-21,
U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., 43d mtg., U.N. Doc. A/Conf.39/l 1 (Apr. 29, 1968) [hereinafter UNCLT,
1st Sess.].
73. Id. 83. The Iranian proposal was withdrawn. Id. 87.
74. Id. [ 4.
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would be "easy" for one state to see whether another had acted consist-
ently with its internal law concerning consent to be bound.75 The Swed-
ish delegate echoed the comments of Pakistan:
[H]ow could a State know the internal law of another State? The best
method would be to ask the government of the other State, but the
latter, by showing its readiness to conclude the treaty, had already
indicated[ ] that it considered itself competent to do so. An alterna-
tive would be to seek the opinion of lawyers of the country with
which the State intended to conclude a treaty. If the lawyers decided
that the projected treaty or the manner of its conclusion conflicted
with the internal law, it would seem difficult for one government to
point out to another that in virtue of certain provisions of its internal
law it was not empowered to conclude the treaty. A rule requiring
such interference in the internal politics of other States did not seem
feasible.76
The Swiss delegate added that requiring a state to "examine in detail the
constitution of States with which it was negotiating" could "become a
source of endless complications and disputes."77
Despite these qualms, the requirement that the provision violated be
"fundamental" was approved.78 At the Eighteenth Plenary Meeting in
1969, Cameroon raised the issue again, moving to delete the requirement
on the ground that "[i]n order to apply that provision, a State party to a
treaty would have to consider the provisions of the internal law of
another State and determine which were of 'fundamental importance'°"79
The delegate from the Soviet Union spoke against the motion on the
ground that the phrase was needed to preclude "the possibility that even
secondary rules of internal law might be invoked" to free a state of its
75. Id. 1 10.
76. Id. 37. The Swedish delegate went on to note that most states recognized that "de facto
governments, in other words governments effectively exercising power but disregarding
constitutional rules, could bind their States by treaty." Id. 39; see also United Nations
Conference on the Law of Treaties, G.A. Res. 2166 (XXI), 43, 2nd Sess., 18th plenary mtg.,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/Il/Add.I (May 9, 1969) (similar argument by Swedish delegate in
subsequent meeting). The concern about interference echoed the earlier commentary by the
International Law Commission, which had drafted the article. The Commission noted that "any
questioning on constitutional grounds of the internal handling of the treaty by another Government
would certainly be regarded as an inadmissible interference in its affairs." International Law
Commission Report, supra note 70, at 242.
77. UNCLT, 1st Sess., supra note 72, 75.
78. Id. at 246; see also United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, First and Second
Sessions, Mar. 26-May 24, 1968, and Apr. 9-May 22, 1969, Vienna, Report of the Committee of
the Whole on Its Work at the First Session of the Conference, at 95, 165-66, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.39/14 (May 1, 1969); United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, G.A. Res. 2166
(XXI), at 463-65, U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., 78th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/Conf.39/l I (May 20, 1968).
79. United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, G.A. Res. 2166 (XXI), T 18, 2nd
Sess., 18th plenary mtg., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/I /Add.l (May 9, 1969).
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treaty obligations.80 The motion was defeated and the requirement that
the violation be of a "fundamental" internal law remained.81
Of course, this discussion of the relationship between international
law and constitutional law concerned a relatively narrow question. It is
interesting, however, in the way that it reveals a strong hesitance to
make constitutional law questions a subject of international law. This
hesitance was expressed partly in terms of concerns about how a state
could interpret another's constitution, and partly in terms of concern that
attempting to do so would constitute "interference" in that state's affairs.
While the provision adopted effectively does make some reference to
constitutional law, it is quite limited in scope.
The drafting of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties took
place over a number of years, but the time of this discussion (in 1968
and 1969) roughly coincided with the advent of a new era in human
rights. In 1966 the General Assembly approved the texts of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR")8 2 and the Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ESC
Covenant")83 and sent them out for ratification. The treaties entered into
force ten years later, in 1976.84 Today the ICCPR has 160 parties, and
the ESC Covenant, 157.85 The widespread commitment by states to
these and other human rights treaties has carved out a significant excep-
tion to sovereignty-in areas that are typically covered by constitutions.
Developments in the decades following the drafting of the Vienna
Convention, in other words, significantly undercut the basis for the hesi-
tation shown at the conference to put states in the position of having to
interpret other states' constitutions. In particular, two human rights that
have been increasingly widely recognized implicate structural constitu-
tional issues fairly easily. One is the right to a judicial remedy for viola-
tion of human rights; the other is the right to democracy or
representative governance. While they do not necessarily entail the
emergence of separation of powers and constitutional fidelity as subjects
of international law, they do lay the groundwork for it.
International law recognizes not only a wide range of human rights
80. Id. 37.
81. Id. at 88.
82. ICCPR, supra note 19.
83. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360 [hereinafter ICESC].
84. See ICCPR, supra note 19; ICESC, supra note 83.
85. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/4.htm
(last visited Feb. 5, 2008); Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/
bodies/ratification/3.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2008).
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but also a right to effective access to a court or other independent tribu-
nal in case of their violation.86 As the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights has noted, this right may be violated if "the Judicial Power lacks
the necessary independence to render impartial decisions or the means to
carry out its judgments."87 Once one moves from a right to an effective
remedy to the independence of the judiciary, it is not difficult to promul-
gate relatively specific constraints on states regarding how they structure
their judiciary and its relation to other branches of government. In 1985,
for example, the U.N. General Assembly endorsed seven principles on
the independence of the judiciary that, among other things, called on
states to give their judiciaries "jurisdiction over all issues of a judicial
nature"; grant the judiciary exclusive competence to determine which
matters are judicial; provide courts with "adequate resources" to perform
their functions; and shield judges and courts from "inappropriate or
unwarranted interference. 88 In 2000, while noting that "there is no one
universal model of democracy," 89 the U.N. General Assembly called on
states to promote democracy by developing "effective public institu-
tions, including an independent judiciary."90
To be sure, the implications of mandating judicial independence for
a more general international law requirement of separation of powers
might be limited. The very concept of judicial independence is capable
of many interpretations, as is evident from the variety of ways that states
claiming to respect it structure their judiciaries. 9 Moreover, a norm
requiring an independent judiciary would not, at least at first glance,
appear to have anything to say about the balance of power among the
political branches. Perhaps it could simply be limited to specifying a
role for the judiciary in protecting individual and group human rights.
86. See Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 25,
Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention on
Human Rights] ("right to judicial protection"); ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 2(3); see also
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms arts. 5, 6, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention].
87. Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (Arts. 27(2), 25 and 8 of the American
Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-9/87, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 9,
24 (Oct. 6, 1987).
88. Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders, Milan, Aug. 26-Sept. 6, 1985, Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary,
(H 3, 4, 7 A/CONF.121/22/rev.1; see also Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe:
The Moscow Meeting on the Human Dimension, Moscow, Russ., Oct. 3, 1991, 19.2, reprinted
in 30 I.L.M. 1670, 1678 (1991) (endorsing the same principles) [hereinafter CSCE, Moscow
Meeting].
89. Promoting and Consolidating Democracy, G.A. Res. 55/96, pmbl. at 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/
55/96 (Dec. 4, 2000).
90. Id. 1(a), at 2; see also id. l(c)(v), at 4.
91. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Identifying "Independence," 86 B.U. L. REv. 1297, 1297
(2006).
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Even so, more general formulations of the obligation to provide
effective remedies are suggestive. In an advisory opinion in 1990, the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights concluded that states have an
obligation to provide indigents with free legal counsel where necessary
to effectuate a fair hearing. In reaching its conclusion, the Court spoke
broadly of a "duty to organize the governmental apparatus and to create
the structures necessary to guarantee human rights. 92 This broader for-
mulation shows how difficult it might be to confine any given mandate
that affects the internal allocation of powers to one branch alone. As
noted earlier, for example, states may have doctrines of justiciability that
restrict courts' ability to reach certain issues. In some cases these doc-
trines reflect deference to the executive branch in particular; they not
only may set a balance between the judiciary and the executive, but also
reflect executive predominance in that area vis-A-vis the legislature.
Any change in these doctrines could thus also affect the relationship
between the executive and legislative branches. If international law
were to address doctrines of justiciability as part of the norm requiring
states to guarantee judicial independence (as the U.N. General Assem-
bly's seven principles might suggest), it is not hard to conceive how it
might affect more than the powers of the courts alone.
The other human right with implications for constitutional issues is
the right to democracy and representative government.93 The principal
focus of the major human rights treaties, to be sure, concerns the protec-
tion of individual and group rights against the government. But they all
contain provisions that support the idea of a right to democracy. The
Charter of the Organization of American States ("OAS") and the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights are perhaps the most explicit. The
OAS Charter, adopted in 1948, commits member states to "representa-
tive democracy." 94 The American Convention speaks of protecting
"personal liberty and social justice" within a "framework of democratic
institutions," '9 and provides that it does not preclude "other rights or
guarantees that are ... derived from representative democracy as a form
of government." '96
92. Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies (Arts. 46(1), 46(2)(a) and 46(2)(b) of
the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC- 11/90, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) No. 11, 24 (Aug. 10, 1990).
93. Charter of the Organization of American States art. 3(d), Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394,
119 U.N.T.S. 48, amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aries, Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, 721
U.N.T.S. 324 [hereinafter OAS Charter]; see also id. pmbl. 3.
94. Id. pmbl. 3.
95. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 86, pmbl. para. 2.
96. Id. art. 29(c). The European Convention on Human Rights refers to "an effective political
democracy" as the foundation of the rights it protects. European Convention, supra note 86,
pmbl.
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In addition, several human rights treaties guarantee a right of citi-
zens to have the opportunity to take part in public affairs, vote, and run
for office.9 7 Moreover, human rights treaties typically condition certain
limitations on rights on the compatibility of those restrictions with
"democratic society." '98 Finally, they all protect specific rights, such as
the right to self-determination or freedom of speech, which can be seen
as the essential elements of democracy.
99
Other non-treaty documents are even more emphatic. The Inter-
American Democratic Charter states: "The peoples of the Americas have
a right to democracy and their governments have an obligation to pro-
mote and defend it. Democracy is essential for the social, political, and
economic development of the peoples of the Americas.""
The Charter of Paris was adopted in 1990 at the end of the Cold
War by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
("CSCE"), the predecessor to the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe ("OSCE"). The OSCE has fifty-six member states,
including the United States, Canada, and states in Europe and the former
Soviet Union. Member states proclaimed their commitment to
"[d]emocratic government.., based on the will of the people, expressed
regularly through free and fair elections."' 0' They further asserted that
democracy and human rights are inextricably intertwined: "Democracy
has as its foundation respect for the human person and the rule of law.
Democracy is the best safeguard of freedom of expression, tolerance of
all groups of society, and equality of opportunity for each person."'
' 0 2
As with the right to a judicial remedy, the right to democracy might
appear at first to have limited implications for constitutional questions.
There are many ways to structure a democratic government and to han-
dle changes to constitutions. But for two reasons it may not be so easy
to leave these issues entirely to domestic law once a right to democracy
is recognized.
97. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 21, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948); ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 2(3);
American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 86, art. 23.
98. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 97, art. 29; see also ICCPR, supra
note 19, arts. 14, 21, 22; European Convention, supra note 86, arts. 6, 8, 9, 10, 11; American
Convention on Human Rights, supra note 86, arts. 15, 16, 22; cf American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man art. XXVIII, O.A.S. Res. XXX, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 (1948) (referring to
democracy).
99. See Reginald Ezetah, The Right to Democracy: A Qualitative Inquiry, 22 BROOK. J. Irrr'L
L. 495, 503-14 (1997); Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86
AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 52-63 (1992).
100. Inter-American Democratic Charter, supra note 65, art. 1.
101. Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Nov. 21, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 190, 194; see also id. at 93
("Human Rights, Democracy and Rule of Law").
102. Id. at 194.
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One is that it is certainly plausible that democracy requires some
kind of separation of powers. It is not difficult to imagine an argument,
for example, that a state cannot truly fulfill its obligation to respect
democracy if all power is concentrated in one person. Similarly, one
could be concerned that major imbalances-for example, the absence of
any effective constraint on elected executives-might coexist for a
period with democracy, but is so likely to undermine it that the interna-
tional legal right to democracy requires respect for separation of powers.
Indeed, the link between democracy and separation of powers is often
mentioned as a virtual given.' °3
The other reason lies in the tendency to link democracy with the
rule of law, and the close relationship between the rule of law and con-
stitutionalism. The Charter of Paris expressly links the first two:
"Democracy, with its representative and pluralist character, entails
accountability to the electorate, the obligation of public authorities to
comply with the law and justice administered impartially. No one will
be above the law." 1°4
Similarly, the Universal Declaration and the European Convention
link the protection of human rights and freedom to the rule of law.10 5
The Inter-American Democratic Charter calls both "the rule of law" and
"the constitutional regimes of the member states" the basis for represen-
tative democracy. 106
Written or unwritten, a constitution is a state's fundamental law.
Of course, it is logically possible that a state might have a written consti-
tution that was largely ignored in practice, yet the state still exhibited
many of the characteristics that one might associate with concepts as
broad and vague as democracy and the rule of law. But it is also highly
plausible to suppose that in many instances in which a state systemati-
103. For example, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, predecessor to the Human Rights
Council, has repeatedly approved resolutions defining democracy to include the separation of
powers, along with other features such as respect for human rights and the rule of law, elections
and multiparty systems, and a free press. See Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights,
Comm. on Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law, 1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/32 (Apr.
19, 2005), available at http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/CHR/resolutions/E-CN_4-RES-2005-
32.doc; Office of the U.N. High Comm'r on Human Rights, Comm. on Human Rights, Enhancing
the Role of Regional, Subregional and Other Organizations and Arrangements in Promoting and
Consolidating Democracy, 1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/30 (Apr. 19, 2004), available at http:/
ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/CHR/resolutions/E-CN_4-RES-2004-30.doc; Office of the U.N. High
Comm'r for Human Rights, Comm. on Human Rights, Interdependence Between Democracy and
Human Rights, 1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/36 (Apr. 23, 2003), available at http://ap.ohchr.org/
documents/E/CHR/resolutions/E-CN_4-RES-2003-36.doc.
104. Charter of Paris for a New Europe, supra note 101, at 194.
105. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 97, pmbl. para. 3; European
Convention, supra note 86, pmbl. para. 5.
106. Inter-American Democratic Charter, supra note 65, art. 2.
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cally failed to follow its own constitution, the kinds of substantive and
procedural values and structures we might associate with democracy and
the rule of law were not being respected as well. My only point is that if
a state's adherence to the rule of law-whatever exactly that may
mean-constitutes a proper subject of international law, it may not be
easy to draw a bright line between that issue and the question of compli-
ance with the state's own constitution.
I call the rights to a judicial remedy and to democracy "anteced-
ents" because they represent international legal rights that easily impli-
cate constitutional issues of separation of powers and constitutional
fidelity. If it were simply a matter of these two rights and no more,
however, there would be little basis for seeing any actual trend in a
direction. Moreover, many different implications can be drawn from
either of these two rights. A right to an independent judiciary might be
conceived as prohibiting a relatively narrow set of actions (such as polit-
ical pressure on judges in individual cases). A right to democracy might
focus exclusively on elections, corruption, and coups. 107 A number of
developments in the last decade or so, however, seem to move interna-
tional law toward bringing separation of powers and adherence to consti-
tutions within its ambit.
B. Regional Formulations
There is an increasing tendency to accord structural constitutional
questions a place in international law. According something a place is
not the same as defining it concretely or making it binding. But for a
matter that might seem purely internal, it is striking that there should be
as many references as there are in regional resolutions and other docu-
ments (including some global texts) to a requirement that states maintain
some degree of separation of powers or checks and balances. What
makes it even more striking are commitments by some regional organi-
zations to take action in response to disruptions of a state's constitu-
tional order. I will examine the three principal bodies that have been
active in this respect: the Organization of American States, the Organi-
zation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the African Union.
1. THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
The OAS's adoption of the Inter-American Democratic Charter in
2001 is noteworthy in several respects. As mentioned earlier, it forth-
rightly declares a "right to democracy." 08 Of course, the Charter is not
a treaty. It is a resolution adopted by the OAS's General Assembly.
107. See Ezetah, supra note 99, at 529-34.
108. Inter-American Democratic Charter, supra note 65, art. 1.
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Some of the language in the Charter can best be understood as making
assertions about the conditions of democracy, rather than articulating
legal obligations. 9 But many of the provisions are framed in relatively
specific language that, to use Thomas Franck's characterization of the
Charter of Paris, "is weighted with the terminology of opinio juris" and
is "deliberately norm creating."' 0 My aim is not to argue that every
aspect of it currently represents some kind of regional customary law,
but to point out that in approving the Charter, the OAS's member states
did not adopt language that was purely exhortatory.
The Charter ties "representative democracy" to respect for member
states' "constitutional regimes."'' The Charter does not spell out eve-
rything that constitutions must include, but Article 3 does state that both
the rule of law and "the separation of powers and independence of the
branches of government" constitute one of the "[e]ssential elements of
representative democracy." '112 In addition, Article 4 requires the "con-
stitutional subordination of all state institutions to the legally constituted
civilian authority.""' The OAS reiterated this commitment in 2005
with the Declaration of Florida, stating that "the rule of law [and] the
separation of powers and independence of the judiciary" are inextricably
bound up with "democratic institutions."
'"14
Article 19 of the Charter also proclaims that "an unconstitutional
interruption of the democratic order or an unconstitutional alteration of
the constitutional regime that seriously impairs the democratic order in a
member state, constitutes, while it persists, an insurmountable obstacle
to its government's participation" in OAS organs." 5 The General
Assembly may, by a two-thirds vote of the members, suspend the mem-
ber state whose constitutional order has been disrupted." 6 Equally
important, if not more so, is the fact that before such a step may be
109. For example, Article 9 states that eliminating discrimination, protecting the rights of
indigenous peoples, and respecting diversity will "contribute to strengthening democracy and
citizen participation." Id. art. 9.
110. Franck, supra note 99, at 67.
111. Inter-American Democratic Charter, supra note 65, art. 2.
112. Id. art. 3.
113. Id. art. 4. It also has provisions that might be regarded as relating to the separation of
powers in a more expansive sense. Article 3 lists as essential to democracy a "pluralistic system
of political parties and organizations." Id. art. 3.
114. Organization of American States, Declaration of Florida, Delivering the Benefits of
Democracy, AG/DEC. 41 (XXXV-O/05), pmbl. para. 18 (June 7, 2005). The OAS has
subsequently reiterated this on a number of occasions. See, e.g., Organization of American States,
Permanent Council, Support for Nicaragua in the Fight Against Corruption, CP/RES. 824 (1337/
02), pmbl. OEA/Ser.G. (Sept. 25, 2002) ("the separation of powers and independence of the
branches of government are essential elements of representative democracy").
115. Inter-American Democratic Charter, supra note 65, art. 19.
116. Id. art. 21.
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taken, the OAS Secretary General or its Permanent Council may offer its
good offices to help resolve the constitutional crisis." 7
What might constitute a disruption of constitutional democracy?
By the terms of Article 19, there would need to be either an "interrup-
tion" of the constitutional order or an "alteration" of it that "seriously
impair[ed] the democratic order." " 8 In addition, the interruption or the
alteration would have to have come about through "unconstitutional"
means. 1 9 The OAS has not defined any of these terms. Addressing the
OAS in January 2005, former President Jimmy Carter "call[ed] on all
governments of the hemisphere to make the Democratic Charter more
than empty pieces of paper."1 20  The Charter is "weak," he said,
"because it is vague in defining conditions that would constitute ... [an]
'unconstitutional alteration or interruption' of the democratic order."' 2'
He went on to list eight factors that he said could help determine when
representative democracy has been disrupted. These included
"[v]iolation of the integrity of central institutions, including constitu-
tional checks and balances providing for the separation of powers,"
"[a]rbitrary or illegal removal or interference in the appointment or
deliberations of members of the judiciary or electoral bodies," and
"[i]nterference by non-elected officials, such as military officers, in the
jurisdiction of elected officials."'
' 22
The generality of the language used in the Charter makes its appli-
cation to particular circumstances more difficult. Even the proposals
that former President Carter offered fall well short of the "clear defini-
tion of 'unconstitutional alteration or interruption"' he thought was nec-
essary. One might wonder whether the Charter was intended to provide
any clear definitions. Presidential regimes are common throughout
117. Id. arts. 17-20.
118. Id. art. 19.
119. Id.




122. Id. The Peruvian Ambassador to the OAS made a similar argument when the Charter was
being drafted. The conception of an "alteration of the democratic order," he said, needed to be
made more concrete. In this regard, we could mention the unconstitutional
dissolution of the congress or parliament, failure to recognize a free and fair
election, the holding of elections in the presence of clear signs of fraud or
inequitable conditions that can alter the outcome, the elimination of the balance of
powers, or the existence of a situation of massive human rights violations and
suppression or restriction of individual liberties.
Manuel Rodrfguez Cuadros, Ambassador of Peru, Address at the Regular Meeting of the
Permanent Council of the OAS on the Subject of the Inter-American Democratic Charter (July 11,
2001), available at http://www.oas.org/charter/docs/Peru.htm.
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Latin America, but Canada and other states, including many in the Car-
ibbean, have parliamentary regimes. Could one international (or
regional) norm requiring separation of powers apply to all these coun-
tries? The same question could be asked about a norm that attempted to
gauge the validity of changes to a wide variety of constitutions.
One response to these questions might be to read the Charter sim-
ply to rule out certain extremes-an interpretation that might explain its
broad language as something other than empty rhetoric while still being
realistic about the differences involved. It might accord a wide range of
discretion to states in the allocation of powers so long as there is some
separation of powers. As one group of experts convened by the U.N.'s
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights concluded, "[i]t is
important that no power remains unchecked and that there is a separa-
tion of powers between the different functions of the State."' 23 What
would trigger the ban on the extreme case-that is, what would consti-
tute an "unchecked" power-might be subject to interpretation, but it is
clearly less demanding than any particular allocation of power. Simi-
larly, perhaps the commitment to respond to unconstitutional interrup-
tions or alterations of a constitution simply refers to military coups or
other situations in which the constitution is simply discarded or
amended without even any pretense of legality.
For reasons that I will set out in Part II, this reading of the Charter
may be too modest. But it is worth considering the other possibility-
that this reading is naively ambitious. The breadth and vagueness of the
Charter's language might suggest that member states adopting the Char-
ter intended to address these issues only at the level of exhortation. If
that were true, it would be much more difficult to claim that it represents
any movement at all toward making separation of powers and constitu-
tional fidelity subjects of international law. There are, however, two
reasons for thinking that even with their broad and vague articulations,
the commitments in the Charter may amount to more than "empty pieces
of paper."
First, the Charter is not an isolated document. It embodies a larger
evolution in the OAS's perspective, which formerly emphasized the
principle of non-intervention to a much greater degree. The major
change took place in June 1991, when the OAS General Assembly
adopted the Santiago Commitment to Democracy and Renewal of the
123. Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Conclusions and Recommendations
of the Expert Seminar on Democracy and the Rule of Law, 14 (Mar. 2, 2005), available at http://
www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/democracy/docs/finalconclusions.doc; cf. TiH FEDERALIST No.
47, at 324 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) ("The accumulation of all powers
legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands . . . may justly be pronounced the very
definition of tyranny.").
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Inter-American System. 24 With this document, the OAS committed
itself to "adopt efficacious, timely, and expeditious procedures to ensure
the promotion and defense of representative democracy." The General
Assembly also adopted Resolution 1080, "Representative Democracy,"
the next day, committing the OAS to respond to "any occurrences giving
rise to the sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political
institutional process or of the legitimate exercise of power by the demo-
cratically elected government in any of the Organization's member
states. ' 25 In 1992 the General Assembly approved an amendment to
the OAS Charter (which entered into force in 1997), providing that a
state "whose democratically constituted government has been over-
thrown by force may be suspended" from participation in the OAS by a
two-thirds vote of the member states.' 26 The Inter-American Demo-
cratic Charter also reflects a commitment made by the Third Summit of
the Americas in Qubec City in 2001, in which the heads of state of
American states proclaimed that the "unconstitutional alteration or inter-
ruption of the democratic order in a state of the Hemisphere constitutes
an insurmountable obstacle to the participation of that state's govern-
ment in the Summit of the Americas process."
1 27
A second important consideration is that this change in perspective
has been accompanied by significant OAS responses to a variety of
threats to the member states' constitutional order. Since 1991 the OAS
has taken actions in response to the 1991 coup in Haiti and the
autogolpes in Peru and Guatemala in 1992 and 1993, and has become
involved in diplomatic efforts to help resolve constitutional crises in
other Latin American countries.1 28 Of course, the efficacy of the OAS's
efforts is debatable. In a global economy, one of the more potentially
powerful measures available to the OAS-economic sanctions-may
tend to be less effective when applied on a regional basis. But the
record of action makes the generality of the language in which the
OAS's commitments are expressed appear less as a signal of an inten-
tion not to take the commitments seriously. Indeed, general commit-
124. AG/Res. (XXI-0/91), 3d plen. Sess., OAS doc. 2734/91 (June 4, 1991).
125. Representative Democracy, 1 1, AG/RES. 1080 (XXI-0/91) (June 5, 1991).
126. See Texts Approved by the General Assembly at its Sixteenth Special Session in
Connection with the Amendments to the Charter of the Organization arts. 8-9, AG/doc. 1 (XVI-
E/92) (Dec. 14, 1992).
127. Third Summit of the Americas, Quebec City, Can., Apr. 22, 2001, Declaration of Quebec
City, available at http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/59660.htm.
128. See Stephen J. Schnably, Constitutionalism and Democratic Government in the Inter-
American System, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 155, 159-60 (Gregory
H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000); Andrew F. Cooper & Thomas Legler, The OAS Democratic
Solidarity Paradigm: Questions of Collective and National Leadership, 43 LATIN AM. POL. &
Soc'Y 103, 103 (2001).
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ments can be more conducive to success than specific prohibitions
where what is being protected or promoted is subject to threats that
could be varied and hard to list comprehensively in advance. Confining
the commitments to military coups, for example, would mean that they
could not have applied beyond the military coup in Haiti in 1991.
The Inter-American Democratic Charter, then, is significant for the
way in which it takes issues that might have been thought to be purely
domestic constitutional issues and stakes out a claim on them on the part
of international (or regional) law. The movement in the OAS in this
direction is the most comprehensive, but it is worth examining develop-
ments in other arenas as well.
2. THE OSCE
The OSCE has addressed constitutional issues for some time. In
many respects the commitments it has made are similar to those adopted
by OAS members. The OSCE has not, however, adopted a formal com-
mitment to action of the sort the Inter-American Democratic Charter
envisages.
In November 1990 the heads of state of the CSCE members
adopted the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, committing member
states to "Human Rights, Democracy and [the] Rule of Law."'12 9 Earlier
that year, the Copenhagen Meeting on the Human Dimension of the
CSCE had proclaimed as essential to human rights and human dignity "a
form of government that is representative in character, in which the
executive is accountable to the elected legislature or the electorate."
' 130
Equally important was maintenance of "a clear separation between the
State and political parties. 131
When they approved the Charter of Paris, the Heads of State also
appointed a study group to examine "[c]onstitutional reforms, [t]he rule
of law and independent courts[,] [and the] [d]ivision of power between
legislative, executive and judicial."' 32 The product of this initiative was
the CSCE's Moscow Meeting on the Human Dimension of the CSCE,
held in 1991. At that meeting, the CSCE member states approved a
document with extensive commitments concerning each state's internal
separation of powers. The member states committed to protect the inde-
pendence of the judiciary and to provide for it in each state's constitu-
129. Charter of Paris for a New Europe, supra note 101, at 193.
130. Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, Copenhagen, Den. June 5-29, 1990,
Document of the Copenhagen Meeting, 5.2 (June 29, 1990) [hereinafter Document of the
Copenhagen Meeting].
131. Id. 7 5.4.
132. Charter of Paris for a New Europe, supra note 101, at 223.
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tion. 133 Interestingly, they also committed themselves to a number of
checks and balances that went beyond the traditional balancing of execu-
tive, legislative, and judicial powers.' 34 The member states undertook to
provide opportunities to seek redress against administrative decisions,
through judicial review and other means,13 and to ensure civilian con-
trol of "their military and paramilitary forces, internal security and intel-
ligence services, and the police." '36
More extensive requirements regarding separation of powers have
been under consideration. In December 2005 the OSCE's Ministerial
Council-the OSCE's highest governing body apart from periodic sum-
mits of heads of state or government-adopted a "road map" to reform
and strengthen the OSCE. 13 7 Among other things, it asked the OSCE's
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights ("ODIHR") to
submit a report to the Ministerial Council to be held in December 2006
regarding not only the "[i]mplementation of existing commitments" but
also the development of "[p]ossible supplementary commitments. "138
Issued in November 2006, the ODIHIR report discussed possible
supplementary commitments regarding the holding of elections, coun-
tering terrorism, preventing torture, and protecting against discrimina-
tion. 139  It also discussed possible supplementary commitments
regarding democracy and the rule of law. The ODIHR noted that elec-
tions alone could not "make a genuine democracy." 4 ' What it called
"democratic governance," something it deemed to "reach far beyond the
periodic vote," was also needed."' While taking note of the pitfalls of a
"'democracy template"' that insufficiently recognized the "enormous
diversity of models and systems of government that exist across the
OSCE region," the ODIHR asserted that "the basic ingredients for suc-
cessful democratic systems remain the same." '42 It identified one ingre-
133. CSCE, Moscow Meeting, supra note 88, 19-19.2; see also Vienna Follow-up Meeting
of Representatives of the Participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in
Europe, Nov. 4, 1986-Jan. 19, 1989, Concluding Document, principle 13.9 (1989). http://
findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-m1079/is-n2144_v89/ai_7537751/pg5 (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
134. Cf. Ackerman, supra note 14, at 635-40.
135. CSCE, Moscow Meeting, supra note 88, 18.2-18.4.
136. Id. 25.1.
137. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Ministerial Council, Strengthening
the Effectiveness of the OSCE, MC.DEC/17/05 (Dec. 6, 2005); see also OSCE Meeting Adopts
Reform Road Map, Kvooo NEWS INT'L, Dec. 12, 2005.
138. Strengthening the Effectiveness of the OSCE, supra note 137, 2.
139. ORG. FOR SEC. & CO-OPERATION IN EUR., OFFICE FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTS. & HUMAN
RIGHTS, COMMON RESPONSIBILITY: COMMITMENTS AND IMPLEMENTATION (2006), http:I/
www.osce.org/item/22321.html?ch=761 [hereinafter ODIHR, COMMON RESPoNSIBLrry].
140. Id. T 81, at 29.
141. Id.
142. Id. T 82, at 29.
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dient as "the separation of powers of government. The system of checks
and balances between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches
.. should be viewed as an essential component of a functioning demo-
cratic system."' 143 The ODIHR said that it would seek to formulate com-
mitments for member states to "clarify the role of the executive branch,
including heads of state, vis-A-vis other branches in a democratic system
of government."" 4 The report recommended consideration of some rel-
atively concrete constraints on executive power:
Constitutional arrangements that place the executive above other
branches of government, without effective checks and balances on
this power, are incompatible with the participating States' commit-
ment to democracy and the rule of law. Similarly, changing constitu-
tional terms of the executive through referenda raises legitimate
questions about the "regularity and consistency in the achievement
and enforcement of democratic order. ",
145
In addition, the report recommended consideration of new commit-
ments regarding the judiciary. As the report noted, the need for an inde-
pendent judiciary to protect human rights is already "widely
recognized."1 46 The ODIHR seemed to have more in mind, however:
"[The] importance [of an independent judiciary] for the functioning of a
democratic system of government should be underlined and further
spelled out. In particular, the judicial review of executive and legislative
acts deserves special attention as an essential cog in the machinery of
checks and balances."
' 147
Finally, the ODIHR noted the need for possible additional commit-
ments regarding "law-making." It called for consideration of additional
commitments regarding transparency of the legislature's operations and
the unimpeded operation of political parties.148 It also called for an
emphasis on legislatures' "oversight functions." 149 Focusing solely on
the legislature, the discussion implicitly viewed lawmaking as a function
exclusively or primarily of the legislature-a view that in itself consti-
tutes a position on separation of powers.
Since the issuance of the ODIHR report the OSCE has continued to
explore the possibility of new commitments regarding the rule of law
and separation of powers.150 At the OSCE's annual "Human Dimension
143. Id. 83, at 29 & n.52 (citing Inter-American Democratic Charter, supra note 65, art. 3).
144. Id. 84, at 29.
145. Id. 84 & n.53, at 30 (citing Document of the Copenhagen Meeting, supra note 130, I 2).
146. Id. 85, at 30.
147. Id. 85, at 30; see also id. 88, at 30.
148. Id. 86-87, at 30.
149. Id. 87, at 30.
150. See Strengthening the Effectiveness of the OSCE, supra note 137, § 2, 6 (requesting
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Implementation Meeting" in 2007, the "separation of powers" and
"democratic law-making" were among the topics discussed.' 5' Noting
the importance to democracy of the rule of law, checks and balances,
and the separation of powers, the U.S. Ambassador placed particular
emphasis on exploring possible new commitments limiting executive
power and strengthening legislative and judicial power.
52
Focusing on possible new commitments, the ODIHR report had
much less to say about the issue of constitutional fidelity than about
separation of powers. But the former is an issue the OSCE has long
addressed in some detail, taking the position that a member state's
adherence to its constitution is a matter of international-or at least
regional-concern. In 1990 the Copenhagen Document declared "the
duty of the government and public authorities to comply with the consti-
tution and to act in a manner consistent with the law."' 53 The CSCE
went beyond this generality at the Moscow Meeting, discussed earlier;
member states said that they would support the "legitimately elected
government" of a member state if it were overthrown "by undemocratic
means." '154 They also adopted commitments regarding states of emer-
gency-commitments that effectively internationalized adherence to
member states' constitutions. The Moscow Document provides that "[a]
state of public emergency may not be used to subvert the democratic
constitutional order," '55 that it must be proclaimed "only by a constitu-
tionally lawful body," '56 that a "de facto imposition . . . of a state of
public emergency [that is] not in accordance with provisions laid down
report by OSCE Permanent Council on possible new commitments on the rule of law before the
next ministerial meeting).
151. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Permanent Council, Agenda for
the 2007 Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, PC.DEC/801, July 12, 2007, at 2 (placing
separation of powers on agenda); see also Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe,
Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (Sept. 24-Oct. 5, 2007) (Warsaw, Poland): Annotated
Agenda, CIO.GAL/124/07/Corr.2, at 14-16 (Aug. 1, 2007).
152. United States Mission to the OSCE, Section 8: Rule of Law 1: Separation of Powers;
Democratic Law-making, HDIM.DEL/269/07, at 1, 2 (Sept. 28, 2007); see also Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe, Permanent Council, Address by Ambassador Christian
Strohal, Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR),
685th Session of the Permanent Council, ODIHR.GAL/88/07, at 3 (Oct. 30, 2007) (noting that
emphasis at the 2007 Human Dimension Meeting was given to "preventing an over-concentration
of powers in the executive branch and granting national legislatures the authority to effectively
represent the citizenry and oversee the executive"); United States Mission to the OSCE, Response
to the Report by ODIHR Director Ambassador Strohal, PC.DEL/1042/07, at 1 (Nov. 1, 2007)
(noting support for continued focus in 2008 on "the separation of powers and ... ensuring that
power not be concentrated in one branch of government").
153. Document of the Copenhagen Meeting, supra note 130, 5.3.
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by law is not permissible," '57 and that "the normal functioning of the
legislative bodies" must be guaranteed.
15 8
The OSCE's position on states of emergency bears a strong resem-
blance to views expressed by the U.N. Human Rights Committee, the
body charged with overseeing implementation of the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 4 of the Covenant permits
states to derogate from certain human rights obligations in time of "pub-
lic emergency which threatens the life of the nation." '59 The Article
expressly limits such measures to those that are "strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation," do not involve discrimination based on race
or other prohibited grounds, and are consistent with the state's other
international obligations.16 ° While the text itself mentions nothing about
constitutional law, the Human Rights Committee has interpreted Article
4 to require states that proclaim an emergency to "act within their consti-
157. Id. 28.4.
158. Id. 28.5. Compare the provisions of the Paris Minimum Standards of Human Rights
Norms in a State of Emergency:
3. While assuming or exercising emergency powers every state shall respect the
following principles:
(a) The fundamental functions of the legislature shall remain intact despite the
relative expansion of the authority of the executive. Thus, the legislature
shall provide general guidelines to regulate executive discretion in respect
of permissible measures of delegated legislation.
(b) The prerogatives, immunities and privileges of the legislature shall remain
intact.
(c) The guarantees of the independence of the judiciary and of the legal
profession shall remain intact. In particular, the use of emergency powers
to remove judges or to alter the structure of the judicial branch or otherwise
to restrict the independence of the judiciary shall be prohibited by the
constitution.
5. The judiciary shall have the power and jurisdiction to decide: firstly, whether or
not an emergency legislation is in conformity with the constitution of the state;
secondly, whether or not any particular exercise of emergency power is in
conformity with the emergency legislation; thirdly, to ensure that there is no
encroachment upon the non-derogable rights and that derogatory measures
derogating from other rights are in compliance with the rule of proportionality;
and fourthly, where existing municipal laws and orders are not specifically
rescinded or suspended, the judiciary shall continue to regard them as being in
effect. A court of law shall have full powers to declare null and void any
emergency measure (legislative or executive) or any act of application of any
emergency measure which does not satisfy the aforesaid tests.
Richard B. Lillich, Current Developments, The Paris Minimum Standards of Human Rights
Norms in a State of Emergency, 79 AM. J. IN'L L. 1072, 1075 (1985). These standards were
developed as a nongovernmental project of the International Law Association. Id. at 1072.
159. U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, HUMAN RIGHTS COMM., General Comment 29,
States of Emergency (Article 4), 3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/REv.I/ADD.11 (AuG. 31, 2001),
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/71eba4be3974b4f7cl256ae2005l7361/$FILE/GO
144470.pdf.
160. Id. 4, 8, 9.
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tutional and other provisions of law that govern such proclamation and
the exercise of emergency powers. '
Finally, as noted earlier, 6 2 the ODIHR's November 2006 report
also made reference to concerns about "changing constitutional terms of
the executive through referenda."'' 63 Read most expansively, this might
be taken to encompass even situations in which the referendum was con-
ducted in accordance with the constitution's amending procedures and
asked the voters to endorse a change that was not blatantly contradictory
to any substantive limits on amendments that the constitution might pur-
port to impose.
The OSCE encompasses perhaps a wider range of types of govern-
ment than does the OAS. While the issue of new commitments remains
under review, 164 there is no guarantee that the OSCE will emulate the
OAS's adoption of the Inter-American Democratic Charter. Still, the
ODIHR's willingness to propose fairly specific recommendations-
mandating judicial review, ruling out particular kinds of constitutional
amendments on substantive or procedural grounds (or both), enhancing
legislatures' oversight of the executive branch-is a striking develop-
ment in itself.
3. AFRICAN UNION
The African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights,
165
which entered into force in 1986, does not protect a right to democracy
as such. But it does contain a provision similar to Article 25 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognizing the
right of individuals to participate in government, "either directly or
through freely chosen representatives in accordance with the provisions
of the law."'166 Subsequently, the African Union ("AU") has recognized
a right to democracy and tied it to constitutional fidelity and respect for
separation of powers.
In response to the end of the Cold War, the Organization of African
Unity ("OAU") (the predecessor to the African Union) adopted in 1990
a Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the
Organization of African Unity on the Political and Socio-Economic Sit-
uation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the
161. Id. 2.
162. See supra text accompanying note 145.
163. ODIHR, COMMON RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 139, 84, at 30.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 150-52.
165. African [Banjul] Charter on Human Rights and People's Rights, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M.
58.
166. Id. art. 13.
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World. 167 Much of the Declaration concentrated on the urgent need to
"arrest and reverse the steady decline in Africa's economic perform-
ance."' 168 But the OAU also linked economic development to the pro-
motion of popular participation in government, human rights, and the
rule of law.
169
Meeting in Algiers in 1999 as they prepared to transform the OAU,
the heads of state declared that "Member States whose Governments
came to power through unconstitutional means after the Harare Summit,
should restore constitutional legality before the next Summit."' 7° This
declaration followed on a condemnation two years earlier of a coup that
had taken place in Sierra Leone as OAU members met in Harare,
Zimbabwe. At that time, the OAU called for "the immediate restoration
of constitutional order" in Sierra Leone. 171 The Algiers meeting also
reaffirmed the OAU's commitment to "the establishment of democratic
institutions that are representative of our peoples" in all the member
states. 1
72
In 2000 OAU member states meeting in Lom6, Togo, adopted the
Constitutive Act of the African Union, intended to replace the OAU with
a more effective organization. 173 The Constitutive Act stated the com-
mitment of the member states and the AU to "promote and protect
human and peoples' rights, consolidate democratic institutions and cul-
ture, and ... ensure good governance and the rule of law. 174 At that
same meeting, the heads of state issued a "Solemn Declaration" that
"[d]emocracy, good governance, respect for human and peoples' rights
167. Org. of African Unity [OAU], Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government of the Organization of African Unity on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation
in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World, AHG Res. Decl. 1 (XXVI)




170. OAU, Algiers Declaration, AHG Decl. 142 (XXXV) (July 12-14, 1999), available at
http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Decisions/hog/9HoGAssemblyl999.pdf
[hereinafter Algiers Declaration].
171. OAU, Decisions Adopted by the Sixty-sixth Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers,
(a), OAU Doc. CM Dec. 357 (LXVI) (May 28-31, 1997), available at http://www.africa-
union.org/root/au/Documents/Decisions/com/47CoM_1997b.pdf; see also OAU, Decision on the
Comoros, 4, OAU Doc. CM/2164 (LXXII)-c) (July 6-8, 2000), available at www.africa-
union.org/root/au/Documents/Decisions/comi/52CoM-2000b.pdf (calling for "the return of
Comoros to constitutional order"). For useful background, see African Union, Political Affairs
Department, http://www.africa-union.org/Structure-of-the_CommissionldepPOLITICAL%20
AFFAIRS%20DIRECTORATE.htm#DEMOCRACY (last visited Feb. 8, 2008).
172. Algiers Declaration, supra note 170, para. 19.
173. Constitutive Act of the African Union, July 11, 2000, available at http://www.africa-
union.org/root/au/AboutAu/ConstitutiveAct-en.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2008).
174. Id. pmbl; see also id. arts. 3(g), 4(m).
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and the rule of law are prerequisites for the security, stability and devel-
opment of the Continent,"' 75 and affirmed their commitment to "a strict
adherence to the rule of law, good governance, peoples['] participation
in public affairs, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the
establishment of political organizations devoid of sectarian, religious,
ethnic, regional and racial extremism."' 76 Finally, they specifically
affirmed that "[t]he Executive, legislative and judicial branches of gov-
ernment must respect their national constitutions and adhere to the pro-
visions of the law and other legislative enactment promulgated by
National Assemblies. No one should be exempted from
accountability."' 77
These declarations engaged the issue of constitutional law at least
to the extent of constitutional fidelity, requiring member states to adhere
to their own constitutions. Putting the duty to respect the constitution
not on the state but on the executive, legislative, and judicial branches
did, however, implicitly also make the separation of powers something
of a regional issue. The true significance of this engagement, however,
is revealed in more specific actions taken at the Lom6 meeting and
subsequently.
One of the resolutions approved in Lomd was the Declaration on
the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of
Government (Lom6 Declaration).1 78 Noting that the "phenomenon of
coup d'etat has resulted in flagrant violations of the basic principles" of
the OAU and UN, the heads of state proclaimed their commitment
"common values and principles for democratic governance.' '1 79 In addi-
tion to requiring respect for human rights, the values and principles
included:
i) adoption of a democratic Constitution: its preparation, content
and method of revision should be in conformity with generally
acceptable principles of democracy;
ii) respect for the Constitution and adherence to the provisions of
the law and other legislative enactments adopted by Parliament;
iii) separation of powers and independence of the judiciary;
iv) promotion of political pluralism or any other form of par-
175. OAU, CSSDCA Solemn Declaration, I 9(H), OAU Doc. AHG/Decl. 4 (XXXVI) (July
10-12, 2000), available at www.africa-union.org/Special-Programs/CSSDCA/cssdca-solemn
declaration.pdf.
176. Id. 11.
177. Id. I I I(a).
178. OAU, Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes
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ticipatory democracy and the role of the African civil society,
including enhancing and ensuring gender balance in the political
process;
v) the principle of democratic change and recognition of a role for
the opposition;
vi) organization of free and regular elections, in conformity with
existing texts.
180
The member states further agreed on a "definition of situations that
could be considered as situations of unconstitutional change of
government":
i) military coup d'etat against a democratically elected
Government;
ii) intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratically elected
Government;
iii) replacement of democratically elected Governments by armed
dissident groups and rebel movements;
iv) the refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to
the winning party after free, fair and regular elections.
181
In the event of an unconstitutional change of government, the members
pledged to press for a return to constitutional order through means
including suspension of the state's membership and the imposition of
sanctions.
Like the Inter-American Democratic Charter, the Lom6 Declaration
makes the maintenance of separation of powers and the independence of
the judiciary a subject of regional concern, though in fairly general
terms. Its provisions on constitutional fidelity are both narrower and
wider than those in the Inter-American Democratic Charter. On the one
hand, the Lom6 Declaration goes beyond the Charter by requiring that
adoption and revision of constitutions be made-both in form and con-
tent-"in conformity with generally acceptable principles of democ-
racy."'182 On the other hand, its definition of what constitutes an
unconstitutional change of government is relatively specific. It focuses
almost exclusively on the overthrow of a government by force, though it
also includes an incumbent government's refusal to acknowledge an
election loss.
In 2002 the AU took two additional steps. The AU adopted a Dec-
laration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance
in connection with its New Partnership for Africa's Development
("NEPAD"). The NEPAD Declaration affirmed member states' com-
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"through democracy and good governance."'' 83 It committed member
states to observe the rule of law and maintain "strict adherence" to the
AU's ban on unconstitutional changes of government.1 84 It also
included a number of provisions on the separation of powers, mention-
ing not only the requirement of an independent judiciary, 185 but also
development of an "accountable, efficient and effective civil service"
and promotion of the "effective functioning of parliaments and other
accountability institutions ... including parliamentary committees and
anti-corruption bodies."' 86
Also in 2002 the AU adopted a plan for a Peace and Security Coun-
cil within the AU "as a standing decision-making organ for the preven-
tion, management and resolution of conflicts."' 87 The Protocol directed
the Council (in conjunction with the Chair of the AU's Commission) to
"institute sanctions whenever an unconstitutional change of Govern-
ment" as defined in the Lom6 Declaration took place in a member
State. "'88 As will be discussed below, however, the AU soon discovered
during Togo's constitutional crisis in 2005 that confining constitutional
fidelity to a relatively narrow class of blatant violations is not easy.' 89
In January 2007 the AU promulgated an African Charter on
Democracy, Elections, and Governance ("African Charter"). 9° This
treaty, which incorporates the NEPAD Declaration of 2002, '' will enter
into force after fifteen states have ratified it. 192 The treaty requires states
to follow a number of specific guidelines to fulfill its general commit-
ment to respect the separation of powers. 193 These include requirements
183. New Partnership for Africa's Development [NEPAD], Declaration on Democracy,
Political, Economic and Corporate Governance, 5, NEPAD Doc. AHG/235 (XXXVIII), Annex
1 (June 18, 2002), available at www.nepad.org/2005/files/documents/2.pdf [hereinafter NEPAD
Declaration].
184. Id. arts. 7, 13.
185. Id. arts. 7, 14.
186. Id. art. 14; see also id. art. 7. The AU also adopted a mechanism enabling member states
voluntarily to submit to periodic AU reviews of their implementation of the NEPAD Declaration.
NEPAD, The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) (Sept. 16, 2003), available at
www.nepad.org/2005/files/documents/49.pdf.
187. Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African
Union art. 2(1), July 10, 2002, available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/
Treaties/Text/Protocol-peace and security.pdf.
188. Id. art. 7(g).
189. See infra Part 1I.B.
190. African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, Jan. 30, 2007, available at
http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/text/Charter on Democracy.pdf.
191. Id. art. 36.
192. Id. art. 48. Since 2007 seventeen AU members have signed it; none have ratified it. See
STATUS LIST, AFRIcAN CHARTER ON DEMOCRACY, ELECTIONS AND GOVERNANCE, available at
http://www.africa-union.org/rootlau/Documents/Treaties/list/Charter-on-Democracy and_
Govemance.pdf (last visited Mar. 23,,.2008).
193. African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, supra note 190, art. 3(5).
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to "strengthen and institutionalize constitutional civilian control over the
armed and security forces";19 4 establish independent "public institutions
that promote and support democracy and constitutional order" that are
"accountable to competent national organs";19 establish "independent
and impartial national electoral bodies responsible for the management
of elections"; 19 6 enhance "functioning and effectiveness of parlia-
ments" ;197 and guarantee an independent judiciary. 198 The treaty also
requires states to "decentralize power to democratically elected local
authorities," though it qualifies this obligation by adding "as provided in
national laws."1 99
With respect to the issue of constitutional fidelity, the African
Charter essentially adopts the definition of an unconstitutional change of
government put forth in the Lom6 Declaration, 20 0 but adds one other
instance: "Any amendment or revision of the constitution or legal instru-
ments, which is an infringement on the principles of democratic change
of government. ' 2° 1 This broad prohibition encompasses far more than
military coups. Moreover, the Charter will also commit the AU to
''exercise its responsibilities in order to maintain the constitutional
order" in any situation that "arises in a State Party that may affect its
democratic political institutional arrangements or the legitimate exercise
of power.
202
The breadth of this last provision is consistent with the extent to
which the African Charter makes questions of adherence to the constitu-
tion a subject of regional concern. The African Charter sets out enforce-
ment mechanisms in case of unconstitutional changes of government
including the imposition of sanctions,20 3 and requires states to punish
perpetrators of any unconstitutional change of government and ban them
from "elections held to restore the democratic order.' ' 2°4 In two ways it
also addresses issues of constitutional fidelity that go beyond unconstitu-
tional changes of government. It attempts to specify the fundamental
role of a constitution within a state, requiring AU members to "entrench
194. Id. art. 14(1).
195. Id. arts. 15(1), 15(3).
196. Id. art. 17(1).
197. Id. art. 32(2); see also id. art. 27(1).
198. See id. arts. 2(5), 27(3), 32(3).
199. Id. art. 34.
200. See id. art. 23(l)-(4); see also Lom6 Declaration, supra note 178.
201. African Charter on Democracy, Governance and Elections, supra note 190, art. 23(5).
202. Id. art. 24.
203. Id. art. 25(7) ("The Assembly may decide to apply other forms of sanctions on
perpetrators of unconstitutional change of government including punitive economic measures.").
See generally id. art. 25.
204. Id. arts. 25(4); see also id. arts. 14(2), 25(9).
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the principle of the supremacy of the constitution in the political organi-
zation of the State. 2 °5 And it requires that no amendment or revision of
a constitution be made except on the basis of "consensus," and places
special emphasis on referenda as the vehicle for amendment.2 °6
4. OTHER REGIONAL GROUPS
A variety of other regional groups, including some directed toward
regional economic integration, have also made commitments concerning
constitutional structure. Meeting in Harare, Zimbabwe, in 1991, the
heads of government of the Commonwealth adopted a declaration pledg-
ing to work toward "democracy, democratic processes and institutions
which reflect national circumstances, the rule of law and the indepen-
dence of the judiciary, [and] just and honest government."20 7 In 1995
they pledged to take diplomatic and other actions whenever "a member
country is perceived to be clearly in violation of the Harare Common-
wealth Declaration, and particularly in the event of an unconstitutional
overthrow of a democratically elected government.
20 8
In 2000 the Community of Democracies ("CD"), an intergovern-
mental organization of more than a hundred states claiming adherence to
democratic principles, first convened in Warsaw at the initiative of then
U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. 20 9 The foreign ministers
approved a Warsaw Declaration that expressed their commitment to the
protection of human rights and democratic elections. Among the spe-
cific principles they endorsed as "core democratic principles and prac-
tices" were a "competent, independent and impartial judiciary," elected
legislatures, and "civilian, democratic control over the military.
210
They also called on elected leaders to "uphold the law and function
205. Id. art. 10(1).
206. Id. art. 10(2) ("State Parties shall ensure that the process of amendment or revision of
their constitution reposes on national consensus, obtained if need be, through referendum.").
207. Harare Commonwealth Declaration 9, Oct. 20, 1991, available at http://www.the
commonwealth.org/shared-asp-files/uploadedfiles/%7B7F83FE73-6E7D-45FB-BFBC-FA519E
255E72%7DHarare%2ODeclaration.pdf.
208. Millbrook Commonwealth Action Programme on the Harare Declaration 3, Nov. 12,
1995, available at http://www.thecommonwealth.org/shared-asp-files/uploadedfiles/
%7B914BFD2A-097E-445F-B954-FB2E4812D6E7%7DMillbrookDeclaration.pdf. In 2006 the
Commonwealth suspended Fiji's membership over a military coup, and in 2007 suspended
Pakistan's memberhip in response to the declaration of a state of emergency. See 2007
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting: The Kampala Communiqud, 9, 10 (Nov. 25,
2007), available at http://www.thecommonwealth.org/shared-asp-files/GFSR.asp?NodeID=
174528.
209. For the organization's own official history, see Council for a Community of Democracies,
Community of Democracies: The Evolution of a Movement, http://www.ccd2l.org/team
index.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2008).
210. Final Warsaw Declaration: Toward a Community of Democracies, June 27, 2000,
available at http://www.ccd21.orglarticles/warsawdeclaration.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2008).
20081
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:417
strictly in accordance with the constitution of the country concerned"
and to "refrain from extra-constitutional actions. 21
Complementing the AU's Lom6 Declaration was the adoption in
2001 of a Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance by the Eco-
nomic Community of West African States ("ECOWAS"), a trade group
of fifteen West African States.21 2 Proclaiming "[z]ero tolerance for
power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means, '"213 ECOWAS
agreed to respond to situations where "democracy is abruptly brought to
an end by any means" in member states.21 4 Its declaration committed
member states to a set of what it called "constitutional convergence prin-
ciples,' 215 "[e]mpowerment and strengthening of parliaments and guar-
antee of parliamentary immunity, 216 the "[i]ndependence of the
[j]udiciary, ' 2 17  "decentralization of power at all levels of govern-
ance," 21 8 and the subjection of the military and police forces to "legally
constituted civilian authorities. 2 1 9
Regional groups within Central and South America have made sim-
ilar commitments. In 1995, the Central American Integration System
("SICA"), a regional organization dedicated to integration of Central
American states, 220 adopted a Treaty Framework for Democratic Secur-
211. Id.
212. See Protocol A/SP1/12/01 on Democracy and Good Governance, Dec. 21, 2001, available
at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/39/38873556.pdf [hereinafter Protocol on Democracy and Good
Governance]. The Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance was intended to build on
ECOWAS's commitment two years earlier to "promot[e] and consolidat[e] . . . a democratic
government as well as democratic institutions in each Member State." Protocol Relating to the
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security art. 2,
Dec. 10, 1999, available at http:/www.issafrica.org/af/RegOrg/unity-to-union/pdfs/ecowas/
ConflictMecha.pdf; see also OAU, Assembly of Heads of State & Gov't, Declaration of Political
Principles of the Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS Doc. AIDCL. 1/7/91
(July 4-6, 1991).
213. Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, supra note 212, art. 1(c).
214. Id. art. 45(1).
215. Id. ch. 1, § 1.
216. Id. art. 1(a).
217. Id.
218. Id. art. 1(d).
219. Id. art. 20(1); see also Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes
Region art. 6(b), Dec. 15-16, 2006, available at http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F
004BE3B 1/(httplnfoFiles)/60ECE277A8EDA2DDC 12572FB002BBDA7/$file/Great%20Lakes%
20pact.en.pdf (2007) (commitment of eleven African states to "promote good governance, the
rule of law and the respect for human rights through constitutional systems based on the
separation of powers, political pluralism," free elections, and transparency in government).
220. See generally Thomas Andrew O'Keefe, The Central American Integration System
(SICA) at the Dawn of a New Century: Will the Central American Isthmus Finally Be Able To
Achieve Economic and Political Unity?, 13 FLA. J. INT'L L. 243 (2001); Mauricio Baquero-
Herrera, Open Regionalism in Latin America: An Appraisal, 11 LAW & Bus. REV. Am. 139, 161
(2005).
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ity in Central America. 22' The Treaty committed the member states to
respect for human rights, political pluralism, the rule of law, and "the
limitation of the role of the armed forces and of the public security to
their constitutional roles. 22 2 The Protocol of Ushuaia, adopted in 1996
under the auspices of the Southern Common Market ("MERCOSUR"),
requires MERCOSUR to respond to any "interruption in the democratic
order" of its members or associates.2 23 In 2000 the Andean Community
approved a text affirming that "[d]emocratic institutions and a constitu-
tional state that are fully effective" in each member state are essential to
further "economic, social, and cultural integration. '224 The text calls for
the Andean Community to take measures including suspension from the
Community "if the democratic order is disrupted in any of the Member
Countries. 225  In 2002 the Andean Council of Foreign Ministers
adopted a resolution entitled Andean Charter for the Promotion and Pro-
tection of Human Rights.22 6 In this Charter they reaffirmed their 1998
commitment,227 and deemed "essential elements of democracy" the rule
of law and the "separation and independence of powers," among other
things.228
II. INTERPRETIVE PRACTICES: NICARAGUA AND ToGo
The degree to which international organizations-especially
regional ones-have made issues of a constitutional structure more than
a purely national concern is impressive. The commitments, resolutions,
and treaties address with a fair degree of consistency two basic points.
The first is a requirement of separation of powers. Typically this
includes references to an independent judiciary and often to some bal-
ance between legislative and executive powers; references to civilian
control over the military and to political pluralism also relate to the
notions of checks and balances. The other is a requirement that states
221. Tratado Marco de Seguridad Democrdtica en Centroam~rica, Dec. 15, 1995, available at
www.sieca.org.gt/cache/17990000001105/17990000001105.pdf.
222. Id. arts. 1, 2(a), 2(b) (author's translation); see also id. arts. 2(c), 4.
223. Protocolo de Ushuaia Sobre Compromiso Democrditico en el Mercosur, la Repdiblica de
Bolivia y la Repdiblica de Chile, art. 4, July 24, 1998, available at http://www.mercosur.int/
msweb/portal intermediario/Normas/Tratado e Protocolos/ 1998_ProtocoloUshuaia-
CompromisoDemocrdticoES.pdf (author's translation).
224. Additional Protocol to the Cartagena Agreement, Andean Community Commitment to
Democracy art. 1, Oct. 27, 1998, available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/normativa/
democracy.htm.
225. Id. art. 2.
226. Andean Charter for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, July 26, 2002,
available at http://www.comunidadandina.orglingles/documentos/documents/andeancharter.htm.
227. Id. art. 15.
228. Id. art. 14.
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respect and observe their own constitutions. The strongest exhortations
are against coups, but they are by no means limited to such extremes.
Of course, evaluating the legal and practical significance of any one
of the instruments in which these commitments are found would require
a careful attention to its provenance and authority. The instruments
range from treaties to non-binding resolutions. Some have commitments
to particular enforcement mechanisms; others are essentially declaratory.
The context matters as well. Commitments adopted by relatively small
regional trade organizations seeking economic integration of the mem-
bers may well have greater intrinsic significance than those adopted by
organizations that encompass a wide range of states.
My aim in this Part is not to evaluate the precise legal standing of
any of these instruments, nor to analyze their potential significance as
evidence of new emerging customary law norms. Rather, I would like to
examine how states and international organizations have handled the
issues of separation of powers and constitutional fidelity in two specific
cases. What these two cases strongly suggest is that once issues of con-
stitutional structure become subjects of international or regional atten-
tion, it is very hard-perhaps impossible-to confine that attention to
broad principles while scrupulously avoiding a level of detail that one
might think could be left to each country to work out in light of its
particular history and tradition. Any international or regional commit-
ment even just to broadly stated principles of constitutional structure is
likely to elevate (or plunge) all of constitutional law to the level of inter-
national or regional law.
In part this tendency stems from the multitude of ways in which
constitutions can be at least arguably disrespected. General language
may be best for covering a variety of situations, but concerns about
whether general commitments are meaningful or effective can easily
lead to pressure to expand the commitments and make them more spe-
cific. For example, the Lom6 Declaration went beyond a commitment to
oppose military coups to include a commitment to oppose an elected
government's refusal to turn over power to a party that defeats it.2 29 As
noted earlier, the African Charter subsequently added to this list consti-
tutional amendments that infringe on "the principles of democratic
change of government. ' 23 ° It is not hard to see how one might then
propose that the list should also include specific provisions for term lim-
its,231 or limitations on using constitutional amendments to extend or
229. See supra text accompanying note 181.
230. See supra text accompanying note 201.
231. See Nadjita F. Ngarhodjim, African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance: A
Critical Analysis, AR. GOVERNANCE MONITORING & ADVOC. PROJECT, May 2007, at 5, available
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change the term of the executive. 32
The tendency toward greater detail is not simply a theoretical possi-
bility. It is evident in commitments adopted by governments. Equally
important, if there is a stable middle ground between proclamations of
near-meaningless breadth and engagement with constitutional issues at a
fairly deep-and potentially intrusive-level, the experiences of Nicara-
gua and Togo do not make it immediately evident.
A. The Nicaraguan Constitutional Crisis of 2004 and 2005:
Separation of Powers and Constitutional Amendment
This constitutional crisis owed its origins to a political alliance
formed in 1999 during the presidency of Arnoldo Alemdn, leader of the
Constitutional Liberal Party ("PLC"). The Pact, as it was called in Nica-
ragua, allied the Sandinistas ("FSLN")-the party that had ruled Nicara-
gua from the revolution in 1979 through 1990-with the PLC, which
had been a member of the coalition that had defeated Daniel Ortega's
bid for reelection in 1990. The Pact was a controversial development
for members of both parties, though not without precedent in Nicara-
guan politics. 233 Explanations and justifications for it varied. Defenders
portrayed the Pact as an effort to limit party fragmentation and create a
more stable two-party system. Many observers traced it to other factors:
a desire on the part of both Alemdn and Ortega (still the leader of the
FSLN) to immunize themselves from possible prosecution, 34 and an
at http://www.afrimap.org/English/images/paper/ACDEGNgarhodjim-EN.pdf ("[W]e could
legitimately expect the Africin Charter on Democracy to opt clearly for a limitation of the number
of successive presidential terms that may be held. As surprising as it may seem, the expression
'term in office' is completely absent from the text."). But see Edward R. McMahon, The African
Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance: A Positive Step on a Long Path, AFR.
GOVERNANCE MONITORING & ADVOC. PROJECT, May 2007, at 3, available at http://afrimap.org/
english/images/paper/ACDEG&IADCMcMahon.pdf (arguing that substitution of more general
language in final version of the Charter for an earlier draft provision focusing specifically on term
limits was an improvement because more general language will encompass more "anti-democratic
actions").
232. See supra text accompanying note 145.
233. See David Close, Undoing Democracy in Nicaragua, in UNDOING DEMOCRACY: THE
POLITICS OF ELECTORAL CAUDILLISMO 1, 11 (David Close & Kalowatie Deonandan eds., 2004)
(noting history of pacts in Nicaragua between government and main opposition) [hereinafter
UNDOING DEMOCRACY]; see also ALAIN ROUQU[P, THE MILITARY AND THE STATE IN LATIN
AMERICA 156-65 (Paul E. Sigmund trans., 1987) (same).
234. AlemAn faced allegations of corruption during his presidency and his earlier service as
mayor Managua. See, e.g., Kalowatie Deonandan, The Assault on Pluralism, in UNDOING
DEMOCRACY, supra note 233, at 43, 59-60. See generally Andrds Pdrez-Baltodano, Nicaragua:
actores nacionales y fuerzas externas en las elecciones de 2006, NUEVA SOCIEDAD, July-Aug.
2006, at 14, 15-16. Ortega's stepdaughter charged in 1998 that he had abused her over many
years, and sought criminal prosecution. See DAVID CLOSE, NICARAGUA: THE CHAMORRO YEARS
201 n.45 (1999); KATHERINE ISBESTER, STILL FIGHTING: THE NICARAGUAN WOMEN'S MOVEMENT,
1977-2000, at 205-07 (2001).
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effort to ensure the two parties' dominance and shut out other competi-
tors.235 It likely also represented a calculated gamble on the part of each
of the two leaders that it would be his own party that benefited most
from the deal.
The Pact called for a number of changes to the constitution and the
electoral laws.23 6 These changes had the potential for effecting a serious
transformation of Nicaragua's constitutional order into one less pluralis-
tic and participatory, by constitutionally entrenching two parties and
reducing checks on the executive. The Pact called for the constitution to
be amended to increase the number of seats on the Supreme Court and
the Supreme Electoral Council, permitting the appointment of new
members who would ensure the parties' dominance in those bodies
through appointment of partisans. 23 7  Another constitutional change
would lower the percentage of the vote a presidential candidate would
need to avoid a run-off, a change sought by the FSLN.238 Several other
235. See MANUEL OROZCO, INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND MOBILIZATION OF DEMOCRACY:
NICARAGUA IN THE WORLD 113 (2002) ("The pact ... was designed to exclude other political
forces from electoral competition or at least make participation extremely difficult."); David
Close, President Bolaflos Runs a Reverse, or How Arnoldo Alemdn Wound Up in Prison, in
UNDOING DEMOCRACY, supra note 233, at 167, 179 ("[T]he Pact sets the institutional framework
for electoral caudillismo .... "); Elvira Cuadra, Violence and Personal Insecurity: The Alemdn
Administration's Authoritarian Response, in UNDOING DEMOCRACY, supra note 233, at 103, 107
("Th[e] pact ... was mainly about creating a Liberal-Sandinista political duopoly that would
exclude all other political forces"). On the loosening of checks on the executive, see Deonandan,
supra note 234, at 183, 187-88.
236. For descriptions of the Pact, see OROzCo, supra note 235, at 113-15, and Katherine Hoyt,
Parties and Pacts in Contemporary Nicaragua, in UNDOING DEMOCRACY, supra note 233, at
17-42, and see also CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (DR-CAFTA) wrrH THE UNITED
STATES 65-66 (2005), http://www.house.gov/spratt/crs/RL32322.pdf [hereinafter DR-CAFTA
REPORT].
237. See Ley No. 330, 18 Jan. 2000, Ley de Reforma Parcial a la Constituci6n Polftica de la
Reptiblica de Nicaragua [Partial Reform Law to the Political Constitution of the Republic of
Nicaragua], art. 6, La Gaceta [L.G.], 19 Jan. 2000 (Nicar.) (expanding the number of Supreme
Court magistrates from twelve to sixteen); id. art. 7 (expanding the Supreme Electoral Council
from five to seven magistrates, with three alternates). On the reforms and their effect, see
OROZCO, supra note 235, at 115-16; CENTRO NICARAGOENSE DE DERECHOS HUMANOS, INFORME
SOBRE DERECHOS HUMANOS EN NICARAGUA 2004-2005, at 12, http://www.cenidh.org/files/
Informe%20sobre%20Situacion%20de%20Derechos%2OHumanos%202004%20y%202005.pdf
[hereinafter CENIDH REPORT].
238. Previously a mn-off was required if no candidate received at least 45% of the vote.
Constituci6n Polftica de la Repdiblica de Nicaragua [Cn.] [Constitution], tit. VIII, ch. III, art. 147,
La Gaceta [L.G.], 9 January 1987, as amended by Ley No. 192, Reforma Parcial a la Constituci6n
Polftica de la Reptiblica de Nicaragua, Feb. 1, 1995, L.G. July 4, 1995. With the constitutional
amendments, this figure was reduced to 40% (or 35% if one candidate led the runner-up by at
least 5%). Constituci6n Polftica de la Reptiblica de Nicaragua [Cn.] [Constitution] tit. VIII, ch. II,
art. 147, La Gaceta [L.G.], 9 January 1987, as amended by Ley No. 330, Reforma Parcial a la
Constituci6n Polftica de la Reptiblica de Nicaragua, Jan. 18, 2000, L.G. Jan. 19, 2000. See
generally ISBESTER, supra note 234, at 208 (regarding the Pact's changes to electoral laws);
Walter Lacayo Guerra, Nicaragua: Alternativas electorales, NUEVA SOCIEDAD, May-June 2001,
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changes were to be made as well. The Office of Comptroller General
would no longer be occupied by one head and a deputy but by a panel of
five,239 undercutting the power of a Comptroller General who had
undertaken a serious investigation of corruption charges against
Alemdn. 40 Former presidents and vice-presidents would automatically
be given seats in the Assembly, 24' and the margin needed for the Assem-
bly to strip a sitting president of immunity would be raised from an
absolute majority to two-thirds.2 42
The Nicaraguan Constitution provides for "partial" and "total"
reforms through amendment. In the case of partial reforms, the constitu-
tion permits the National Assembly to make revisions on its own, by a
sixty percent majority, so long as the amendments are approved in two
successive sessions.2 43 In the case of a total revision of the constitution,
on the other hand, the Assembly must give two-thirds approval, with
final approval granted by a specially elected Constituent Assembly.2 1 It
is not surprising, then, that while the constitutional amendments had a
potentially sweeping effect, the two parties-which held more than sixty
percent of the seats in the Assembly-treated them as partial rather total,
and approved them through votes in two successive sessions.
2 45
Alemdn's successor was Enrique Bolafios, a Liberal elected in
2001 .246 He had served as Alemin's vice-president and was nominated
at 12, 17-18. For the 1987 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution with the 1995 reforms, and the
1987 Constitution with the 1995, 2000, and 2005 reforms, see Georgetown University, Political
Database of the Americas, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Nica/nica.html (last visited
Feb. 10, 2008).
239. Ley No. 330, 18 Jan. 2000, Ley de Reforma Parcial a la Constituci6n Polftica de la
Repdblica de Nicaragua [Partial Reform Law to the Political Constitution of the Republic of
Nicaragua], art. 5, La Gaceta [L.G.], 19 Jan. 2000 (Nicar.) (amending Art. 154 of the 1995
Constitution).
240. On the Comptroller's investigation and Alemdn's reaction, see Hoyt, supra note 236, at
21-24.
241. Ley No. 330, 18 Jan. 2000, Ley de Reforma Parcial a la Constituci6n Polftica de la
Reptiblica de Nicaragua [Partial Reform Law to the Political Constitution of the Republic of
Nicaragua], art. 3, La Gaceta [L.G.], 19 Jan. 2000 (Nicar.) (amending Art. 133 of the 1995
Constitution).
242. Id. (amending Art. 130 of the 1995 Constitution); see also Michael E. Allison, The
Transition from Armed Opposition to Electoral Opposition in Central America, LATIN Am. POL.
& Soc'y, Winter 2006, at 137, 143.
243. Constituci6n Polftica de la Reptiblica de Nicaragua [Cn.] [Constitution], arts. 192, 194, La
Gaceta [L.G.], 9 January 1987, as amended by Ley No. 527, Reforma Parcial a la Constituci6n
Polftica de la Reptiblica de Nicaragua, Apr. 5, 2005, L.G., Apr. 8, 2005. Unless otherwise
specified, references to the constitution are to the constitution as currently in force.
244. Id. art. 193.
245. The introduction of a seemingly technical change to the revisions before the second vote
(which had the practical effect of barring a potential candidate for mayor of Nicaragua) proved no
impediment to approval, though some commentators asserted that it rendered the amendments
unconstitutional. See Hoyt, supra note 236, at 41 n.53.
246. See ORozco, supra note 235, at 119-21.
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on the expectation of continued loyalty to Alemdn. Facing a serious
challenge from Ortega's candidacy, though, he campaigned on an anti-
corruption platform and distanced himself somewhat from Alemdin, ulti-
mately winning by a wide margin (an outcome the United States openly
favored).,47 Now holding a seat in the Assembly as a former president,
Alemdn was elected president of the Assembly. With the expected com-
plicity of Bolafios, Alemdn sought to exercise effective control from the
legislative branch, becoming "Nicaragua's unofficial prime minis-
ter"248-a notable ambition for someone who had sought to strengthen
the executive during his presidency.249
The plan did not work out as Alemdin expected. In August 2002
Bolahios announced corruption charges against Alemin for embezzling
$100 million. 25° The next month the Assembly dismissed Alemdn as
speaker and stripped him of his parliamentary immunity. In Decem-
ber 2003 Alemdn was convicted and sentenced to twenty years in
prison. Still, most PLC members in the Assembly remained loyal to
Alemdn.253
Over roughly the same period, the United States took an active role
in Nicaraguan affairs. It supported Alemdn's dismissal from his post as
speaker of the Assembly. It pressed the PLC to reconcile with Bolafios
and sought to put an end to the Pact. It denounced an order that had
released Alemdin from detention before his trial and conviction as the
politically motivated product of a "corrupt and politicized" judiciary,
suspending $49 million in aid to reform the judiciary. 4  It also
expressed concerns about the stock of Soviet-era shoulder-launched anti-
aircraft missiles the Sandinista government had acquired during the con-
flict with the contras; after September 11, 2001, the United States
pressed the government to destroy these SAM-7 missiles to avoid hav-
ing them fall into the wrong hands. The success of the FSLN in munici-
pal elections in November 2004, with its possible signs of what might
happen in the next presidential election, heightened U.S. concern. 5
247. Id. at 120-22.
248. Close, supra note 235, at 171; see also id. at 168-72.
249. Id. at 168; cf Clifford J. Levy, Putin's Choice Moves To Keep Putin in Power, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 12, 2007, at Al (reporting declaration by prospective presidential successor to
Vladimir Putin that he wants Putin to be prime minister, with the prospect of a shift from a
presidential to a parliamentary form of government).
250. Close, supra note 235, at 167.
251. See id. at 177-78; Nicaraguan Ex-President Faces Judge on Corruption Charge, MIAMI
HERALD, Dec. 14, 2002, at 10A.
252. Close, supra note 235, at 168 & 181 n.3; see also Pdrez-Baltodano, supra note 234, at 17.
253. See Alemdn Gets 20 Years After Sandinista Pact Spurs U.S: Intervention, CARIBBEAN &
CENT. AM. Rap., Dec. 16, 2003.
254. Id.; see also DR-CAFTA REPORT, supra note 236, at 65-66.
255. See CENIDH REPORT, supra note 237, at 4-5; see also Nicaragua: Alenuin Thrown in
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These efforts had limited effect. The effort to spur the PLC into an
alliance with Bolafios failed, 256 and Bolafios remained an isolated figure.
Azul y Blanco, the new party that Bolafios formed after his split with the
PLC, had only a handful of members in the Assembly. 257 The FSLN
and the PLC increasingly used their alliance to challenge Bolafios. For
example, in February 2005, reacting to an earlier commitment by Bola-
fios to the gradual destruction of the military's SAM-7 missiles, the
Assembly approved a law that forbade the president from destruction of
the missiles without prior legislative authorization.258 In June 2005 the
National Assembly stripped some cabinet members of immunity for
alleged campaign finance violations.259 In October 2004 the Office of
the Comptroller General issued a report charging Bolafios with having
benefited from Alemdn's illegal use of public money to support Bola-
fios's 2001 campaign and calling on the Assembly to impeach him.
Bolafios struck back, charging that the five comptrollers (three
members from the PLC and two from the FSLN) were acting on a parti-
san basis, a charge he leveled against the judiciary as well.260 Weakened
politically at home, he actively sought support in the international
arena. 261 The United States denounced the threat of impeachment as one
of a number of "politically motivated attempts, based on dubious legal
precedent, to undermine the constitutional order in Nicaragua. 262 The
threat also prompted SICA's Council of Presidents to make an emer-
gency request to the OAS to send a mission to Nicaragua.263  After
Prison Again, CARIBBEAN & CENT. AM. REP., Mar. 23, 2004; Nicaragua: Liberals Abandon Bid
To Free Alemdn, LATIN AM. WKLY. REP., Mar. 16, 2004.
256. Liberals Rule Out Electoral Alliance with Bolafios, CARIBBEAN & CENT. AM. REP., July
20, 2004.
257. In 2005 the FSLN held 38 seats, the Liberals, 43, and Azul y Blanco, 8. Four other seats
were held by another party. See DR-CAFrA REPORT, supra note 236, at 66; see also Manuel
Ortega Hegg, Nicaragua 2001: Un gobierno sin partido, NUEVA SOCIEDAD, Mar.-Apr. 2002, at 4,
11-12.
258. CENIDH REPORT, supra note 237, at 5.
259. Ludwin Lo~isiga L6pez, Carcabelos no reconocerd desafueros, LA PRENSA (Nicar.), July
13, 2005, http://www-usa.laprensa.com.ni/archivo/2005/J ulio/13/politica/politica-20050713-
02.html.
260. See Nicaragua: Assembly Takes First Step Towards Impeachment, LATIN AM. WKLY.
REP., Oct. 19, 2004; Jos6 Aden Silva, Cinco cheques recibid Bolafios, LA PRENSA (Nicar.), Oct.
16, 2004, http://www-ni.laprensa.com.ni/archivo/2004/octubre/16/nacionales/nacionales-
20041016-1 1.html; see also DR-CAFTA REPORT, supra note 236, at 65.
261. See CENIDH REPORT, supra note 237, at 6 (noting that his political weakness and
isolation at home prompted Bolafios to adopt "un estilo de gobiemo que propici6 el entreguismo y
el constante injerencismo extranjero y, particularmente estadounidense, en los asuntos internos de
Nicaragua").
262. DR-CAFTA REPORT, supra note 236, at 66 (quoting Press Statement, Richard Boucher,
U.S. Dep't of State, Statement on the Situation in Nicaragua (Oct. 16, 2004)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
263. See Press Release, OAS, OAS To Monitor Developments in Nicaragua (Oct. 22, 2004);
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mediation by the OAS the FSLN agreed not to move on the charges until
after local elections scheduled for the following month.264 The OAS's
efforts eventually led to the OAS's announcement in January 2005 of an
agreement to initiate a "national dialogue" on a wide range of institu-
tional issues. 265 This effort; the Acting Secretary General said, would
"give new life to the democratic values and practices affirmed in the
Inter-American Democratic Charter.
2 66
While the impeachment effort ultimately went nowhere, the FSLN
and the PLC also enacted a new round of constitutional amendments.267
It seems likely that these amendments represented a further attempt to
pressure Bolafios to accept the political alliance represented by the
Pact.268 In November 2004 the Assembly gave first approval to a set of
constitutional amendments covering a variety of issues.2 69 As it stood at
the time, the constitution gave the president the power to veto a bill in
full or in part, subject to an override by an absolute majority; the pro-
posed amendments expressly provided for the Assembly to use this
override power for each partial veto.270 The other amendments related
mainly to the appointment and removal of ministers and other high offi-
cials. One amendment would require confirmation by the Assembly of
the president's appointment of individuals to a number of positions for
see also Luis Felipe Palacios, Respaldo regional a Bolaflos, LA PRENSA (Nicar.), Oct. 17, 2004,
http://www-usa.laprensa.com.ni/archivo/2004/octubre/17/nacionales/nacionales-20041017-07.
html. On SICA, see supra text accompanying note 220.
264. See Nicaragua: Bolartos Staves Off Threat, LATNNEWS DAILY, Oct. 20, 2004; Nicaragua:
Bolaflos Seeks OAS Backing, LATIrNNEWS DAILY, Oct. 18, 2004.
265. Press Release, OAS, Support for a National Dialogue in Nicaragua (Jan. 13, 2005). The
issues to be covered included
the professionalization of the Supreme Court, the Supreme Electoral Court and the
Office of the Comptroller General; electoral reform; the institutionalization of
political parties' internal democratic practices; legislation on the financing of
political parties; the availability of free advertising space in the media; and the tax
system applied to the communications media.
Id.; see also Hazel Godoy Z., OEA amenaza, EL NuEvo DIA~io (Nicar.), Jan. 8, 2005, http://
archivo.elnuevodiario.com.ni/2005/enero/08-enero-2005/.
266. Press Release, OAS, Support for a National Dialogue in Nicaragua, supra note 265.
267. See Stephen Temple, Controversial Constitutional Reforms Entered onto Nicaragua's
Statute Books, WORLD MARKETS ANALYsIs, Jan. 19, 2005.
268. See CENIDH REPORT, supra note 237, at 12.
269. See generally Luis Felipe Palacios, Reformas van con todo, LA PRENSA (Nicar.), Nov. 16,
2004, http://www-usa.laprensa.com.ni/archivo/2004/noviembre/16/politica/politica-20041 116-
08.html; Maria Jos6 Uriarte R., Quitan poder a Bolaflos, LA PRENSA (Nicar.), Nov. 26, 2004,
http://www-usa.laprensa.com.ni/archivo/2004/noviembre/26/nacionales/nacionales-2004 1126-
18.html.
270. See Ley No. 520, 18 Feb. 2005, Ley de Reforma Parcial a la Constituci6n Polftica de la
Repiblica de Nicaragua [Partial Reform Law to the Political Constitution of the Republic of
Nicaragua], art. 2, La Gaceta [L.G.], 18 Feb. 2005 (Nicar.) (amending art. 143 of the
constitution); id. art. 5 (amending art. 150(6) of the constitution).
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which no confirmation had previously been required. 271  Another
amendment would expand the Assembly's ability to appoint certain offi-
cials, such as the Superintendent of Banks, from lists proposed by the
deputies as well as lists proposed by the president-essentially placing
the appointment decision entirely in the hands of the legislature.272 The
amendments would also strengthen certain reporting requirements that
ministers and other officials owed the Assembly, and obligate the presi-
dent to fire certain high officials if the Assembly so decided by a sixty
percent vote.27 3 As in 2000, the Assembly deemed these amendments to
be partial reforms.
Taken together, these amendments would certainly have limited the
president's power. They might even be viewed as formalizing Alem.n's
apparent earlier ambitions to create a powerful speakership that could
supplant executive power. Or they might be seen as another manifesta-
tion of a disturbing trend toward instability in the executive branch, with
elected presidents across Latin America being driven out of office before
their terms expired.
On the other hand, it is hard to see the amendments as unthinkable
in the abstract. Presidential systems do not necessarily vest absolute dis-
cretion in the executive on the retention of important officials; executive
officials are subject to impeachment under the U.S. Constitution, for
example. 74 Shifting some power from the executive to the legislature
might be viewed as an attempt to adjust the balance of powers, particu-
larly in light of Nicaragua's recent history. Nicaragua had experienced a
political crisis in 1995 over attempts to amend its Sandinista-era consti-
tution to strengthen the legislature vis-A-vis the executive-attempts
that, ironically, were strongly opposed by then President Violetta
Chamorro, who had defeated Daniel Ortega's bid for re-election as pres-
ident.275 Alemdn had done much to strengthen the presidency during his
term and limit the effect of the 1995 amendments. 76 Even acknowledg-
ing the kind of political advantage that the PLC and FSLN plainly
sought in proposing the amendments, one might view them as further
271. Id. art. 4 (amending art. 138(30) of the constitution).
272. Id. art. 3 (amending art. 138(9) of the constitution).
273. Id. art. I (amending art. 138(4) of the constitution); id. art. 5 (amending art. 150(6) of the
constitution).
274. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 ("The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason,
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.").
275. See Close, supra note 233, at 9. Only after mediation by a "Group of Friends" (Spain,
Mexico, Canada, Sweden, and Holland) was the crisis resolved and amendments adopted.
ORozco, supra note 235, at 92-94.
276. See ISBESTER, supra note 234, at 207-08; OROZCO, supra note 235, at 113; Close, supra
note 235, at 168.
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efforts to create a less executive-oriented balance of power within the
government.
Bolafios's reaction was, not surprisingly, one of strong opposition.
What is perhaps more surprising is his designation of the efforts to limit
his powers as a "rolling coup d'etat. '277 He made two claims in support
of his opposition to the amendments. First, he said, the amendments
severely upset the balance of powers, an essential requirement of
democracy.278 Second, he asserted that the Assembly had acted in con-
travention of the constitution's amending procedures. Such thorough-
going reforms, he said, would not qualify as partial revisions or amend-
ments-something within the Assembly's power to accomplish on its
own-but total reform. And a complete overhaul of the form of govern-
ment, essentially changing it from a presidential to a parliamentary form
of government, could be accomplished constitutionally only by means of
national elections for a constituent assembly. 9
In December 2004 Bolafios filed petitions with the Central Ameri-
can Court of Justice ("CCJ"), SICA's judicial organ, 8 ° and the Nicara-
guan Supreme Court.281  Bolafios asserted that the proposed
amendments, which so far had had only their first reading, were uncon-
stitutional. In a provisional ruling on January 6, 2005, the CCJ accepted
jurisdiction of the dispute, citing Article 22(f) of the Court's statute.
2 82
277. Constitutional Crisis in Nicaragua Worsens Amid Charges of a 'Rolling Coup D'Etat,'
U.S. NEWSWIRE, Sept. 30, 2005. This particular charge referred to the Assembly's decision in
September 2005 to strip seven government officials of their immunity as part of an investigation
of the alleged campaign-finance violations in the 2001 presidential election. But it captures the
tenor of his complaint against all the efforts to limit his powers. See Ludwin Lodisiga L6pez,
Bolaflos acepta irse antes, LA PRENSA (Nicar.), June 21, 2005, http://www-usa.laprensa.com.ni/
archivo/2005/junio/21/nacionales/nacionales-20050621-13.html; see also Press Release, OAS,
Nicaraguan President Tells OAS of Need for a National Referendum (July 14, 2005) (assertion by
President to OAS in July 2005 that the FSLN and Liberal Party had "concentrated hegemonic
power in the legislative branch"); Stephen Temple, Nicaraguan President Calls for Referendum
on Reforms Seeking To End His Mandate, WORLD MARKETS ANALYSIS, July 15, 2005 (quoting
Bolafios as characterizing amendments as creation of a "legislative dictatorship").
278. See CENIDH REPORT, supra note 237, at 18 (noting president's characterization of the
proposed amendments as an attempt to impose on the country "una dictadura bic6fala de cardcter
parlamentarista" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
279. See supra text accompanying notes 243-45.
280. See Statute of the Central American Court of Justice, 34 I.L.M. 921, 923-34 (1995)
[hereinafter "CCJ Statute"]. See generally O'Keefe, supra note 220, at 251-54 (concerning the
creation and the functions of the CCJ); Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferation of International
Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 709, 732-33 (1999)
(same).
281. See Elofsa lbarra A., Guerra de las Cortes, EL NuEvo DiARIO (Nicar.), Mar. 30, 2005,
http://archivo.einuevodiario.com.ni/2005/marzo/30-marzo-2005/nacionalnacional-20050330-
12.html; Maria Jos6 Uriarte R. & Ludwin Lo6.isiga L6pez, CCJ ordena parar reformas, LA
PRENSA (Nicar.), Jan. 7, 2005, http://www-usa.laprensa.com.ni/archivo/2005/enero/07/nacionales/
nacionales-20050107-13.html.
282. Resoluci6n VI, de las 3:00 p.m., 6 Jan. 2005, Gaceta Oficial [Corte Centroamericana de
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That article gives the Court the power to "resolve conflicts that may
arise among the fundamental powers or organs" of SICA members.283
The CCJ called on the National Assembly to suspend the process of
amending the constitution, pending a final decision. 284 The OAS's Act-
ing Secretary General, citing the Inter-American Democratic Charter,
took special note of the decision the next day and essentially called on
the Assembly to respect it.
285
Also on January 7, however, the Nicaraguan Supreme Court ruled
that under Nicaragua's constitution it, not the CCJ, had jurisdiction to
resolve the question of the constitutionality of the proposed amend-
ments.2 86 The court held that the CCJ's interim order was without
effect.28 7 Shortly thereafter the Assembly ignored the CCJ's order and
approved the amendments in a second reading.
288
On March 29, 2005, the CCJ issued its final decision on the merits,
ruling that in giving final approval to the amendments the Assembly had
violated the constitution, and that the amendments would undermine the
independence of the executive. 28 9  These concerns were within the
court's purview, it concluded, because stability and peace in the region,
Justicia], No. 18, 1 Feb. 2005, p. 35, Cons. III, Res. I, available at http://www.ccj.org.ni/press/
gacetas/GacetaNo 18.pdf.
283. CCJ Statute, supra note 280, art. 22(f), at 931 ("The Court's competence includes [the
power] [t]o hear and resolve, at the request of aggrieved parties, conflicts that may arise among
the fundamental powers or organs of the Member States, and disputes which may arise when
judicial verdicts are not respected[.]").
284. Resoluci6n VI, de las 3:00 p.m., 6 Jan. 2005, Gaceta Oficial [Corte Centroamericana de
Justicia], No. 18, 1 Feb. 2005, pp. 35-36, Cons. III, Res. II.
285. Press Release, OAS, Statement by the Secretary General on Nicaragua and the Decision
of the Central American Court (Jan. 7, 2005); Hazel Godoy Z., supra note 265.
286. Resoluci6n, de las 12:30 p.m., 7 Jan. 2005, Gaceta Oficial [Supreme Court of Justice] No.
19, 24 May 2005, pp. 37, 38, Res. I (Nicar.), available at http://www.ccj.org.ni/press/gacetas/
GacetaNol9.pdf; see Elofsa Ibarra A., Choque de Cortes, EL NUEvo DIARIO (Nicar.), Jan. 8, 2005,
http://archivo.elnuevodiario.com.ni/2005/enero/08-enero-2005/nacional/nacional-20050108-01.
html.
287. Resoluci6n, de las 12:30 p.m., 7 Jan. 2005, Gaceta Oficial [Supreme Court of Justice] No.
19, 24 May 2005, pp. 38-39, Res. II (Nicar.).
288. Esteban Solis R., Asamblea no acatard, EL NuEvo DIARIO (Nicar.), Jan. 7, 2005, http://
archivo.elnuevodiario.com.ni/2005/enero/07-enero-2005/nacional/nacional-20050107-08.html;
Esteban Solis R. y Edgard Barberena, Acuerdo se tambalea, EL NUEVo DIARIO (Nicar.), Jan. 14,
2005, http://archivo.elnuevodiario.com.ni/2005/enero/14-enero-2005/nacional/nacional-
20050114-1 1.html.
289. Resoluci6n I, de las 5:00 p.m., 29 Mar. 2005, Gaceta Oficial [Corte Centroamericana de
Justicia], No. 19, 24 May 2005, pp. 5, 24, Res. Seg., Ter. The Court also condemned the
Assembly's having appointed a commission to consider Bolafios's impeachment at the behest of
the Comptroller General, who, the Court held, had no power to initiate impeachment proceedings.
Id. pp. 20-21, Cons. XVII; id. p. 24, Cons. XXII, Res. Seg.; see also Nicaragua: 'Regional' Court
Backs Bolahos Against Assembly, LATLN Am. WKLY. REP., Apr. 5, 2005; supra text accompanying
notes 259-60.
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one of the aims of the creation of the court,2 9 0 depended on the mainte-
nance of the rule of law in member countries; moreover, SICA itself was
aimed in part at consolidating democratic institutions. 291  Nicaragua's
constitution prescribes separation of powers in a presidential system, the
court concluded.292 The amendments represented an attempted transfor-
mation of Nicaragua's system from a presidential one to a parliamentary
regime.29' Because such a change could be accomplished only through
the process prescribed for total revision of the constitution, the amend-
ments were invalid, the CCJ concluded.294
That same day the Nicaraguan Supreme Court issued its own ruling
in response to the petition that Bolafios had filed before it.295 The Court
ruled that Article 22(f) of the CCJ statute was unconstitutional to the
extent that it purported to vest in the CCJ the power to determine dis-
putes among the different branches of Nicaragua's government. The
CCJ's rulings were, according to the Nicaraguan Supreme Court, with-
out legal effect.2 96 While the court's ruling did not specifically uphold
the validity of the amendments, the practical effect was dramatic. Nica-
ragua was left with "two constitutions: one approved by the executive;
and the other approved by the legislature," as one observer put it.
297
290. Resoluci6n I, de las 5:00 p.m., 29 Mar. 2005, Gaceta Oficial [Corte Centroamericana de
Justicia], No. 19, 24 May 2005, p. 15, Cons. II, 1Il.
291. Id. pp. 16, 22-23, Cons. VI, XXII. The Court also cited the Inter-American Democratic
Charter. See id. p. 23, Cons. XXII.
292. Id. pp. 16-19, Cons. VIII-X.
293. Id. pp. 19-20, Cons. XI, XV.
294. Id. p. 24, Res. Ter. The Nicaraguan members dissented. One member dissented
principally on the ground that the dispute over the nature of the amendments was a matter internal
to Nicaragua, though he also faulted the majority for not condemning the Assembly's
consideration of the impeachment of Bolafios in response to the Comptroller General's report as
an attempted coup. Id. pp. 24-25, 27 (Rafael Chamorro Mora, J., dissenting). Another disagreed
with the majority's interpretation of Art. 22(f) and also disputed its conclusion as to the
amendment process, noting that the Nicaraguan constitution incorporates a very flexible
amendment procedure. Id. pp. 28-29 (Orlando Trejos Somarriba, J., dissenting).
295. Sentencia [S.] No. 15, de las 12:00 p.m., 29 Mar. 2005 [Supreme Court of Justice], No.
19, 24 May 2005, pp. 51-52, Por Tanto, Punto IV (Nicar.). Bolafios had attempted to withdraw
the petition but the court ruled that it had a responsibility to resolve the conflict between the
Assembly and the President. Id. p. 49, Cons. IV. The court also rejected Bolafios's suggestion that
the judges recuse themselves.
296. Id. Further complicating matters were charges by critics of the Nicaraguan Supreme
Court's decision that it lacked a proper quorum. See, e.g., Eduardo Marenco Tercero, Una tercia
juridica con trasfondo poiftico, LA PRENSA (Nicar.), Apr. 5, 2005, http://www-usa.laprensa.com.
ni/archivo/2005/abril/05/enfoque/enfoque-20050405-01.html (quoting "constitutional expert").
297. Kate Joynes, President's Isolation Increases as Nicaragua's Vice-President Steps Down,
WORLD MARKETS ANALYSIS, Sept. 28, 2005; see also Decreto No. 43-2005, 23 June 2005,
Decreto de Ejecuci6n y Cumplimiento de la Sentencia Dictada por la Corte Centroamericana de
Justicia, La Gaceta [L.G.], 24 June 2005 (stating that in light of CCJ ruling, the executive would
not recognize the constitutional amendments), available at http://legislacion.asamblea.gob.ni/
Normaweb.nsf/d0c69e2c9 ld9955906256a400077164a/2273e490647f3dc3062570a10058540b?
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Over the next few months, armed with the CCJ's rulings, Bolafios
proved quite successful in internationalizing not only the issue of separa-
tion of powers and checks and balances, but also the entire process of
amending the Nicaraguan constitution. Citing the Inter-American Dem-
ocratic Charter, he made a request to the OAS for mediation.29 The
OAS General Assembly approved the request in June 2005.299 Also
referring to the Inter-American Charter, the General Assembly stated
that developments in Nicaragua posed a "grave threat to the separation
of powers and independence of the branches of government, an essential
element of representative democracy." 3" It approved a mission to Nica-
ragua headed by the Secretary General to "establish a broad national
dialogue, with a view to finding democratic solutions to the serious
problems that exist, with strict observance of the principle of the separa-
tion of powers and independence of the branches of government in the
country."3 0' It also called on the Permanent Council to continue to mon-
itor developments in Nicaragua.3"2 The Secretary General went to Nica-
ragua to meet with Nicaraguan officials, and subsequently appointed the
former Argentinean former minister, Dante Caputo, as a representative
to help mediate a solution.3 °3
Other expressions of international concern were soon forthcoming.
OpenDocument. See generally Ibarra, supra note 281; Marenco, supra note 296; Torn Between
Two Courts in Tangled Dispute, LATIN AM. SPEcIAL REP., Sept. 6, 2005. The Court subsequently
upheld the validity of the amendments, see Kate Joynes, Supreme Court Frees Accused Ex-
President of Nicaragua, Upholds Constitutional Reform, WORLD MARKETS ANALYSiS, Aug. 31,
2005, despite press reports that it might find fault with them because of a variance between the
text adopted in 2004 and approved on second reading in 2005. See Mima Veldsquez Sevilla &
Maria Jos6 Uriarte R., Fallardn contra reformas, LA PRENSA (Nicar.), July 3, 2005, http://www-
usa.laprensa.com.ni/archivo/2005/J ulio/03/nacionales/nacionales-20050703-18.html; see also
Stephen Temple, Nicaraguan Judicial Sources Suggest Controversial Constitutional Reform May
Be Annulled, WORLD MARKETs ANALYsis, July 4, 2005.
298. See Marfa Josd Uriarte & Luis F. Palacios, OEA intentard resucitar didlogo, LA PRENSA
(Nicar.), June 29, 2005, http://www-usa.laprensa.com.ni/archivo/2005/Junio/29/politicalpoliica-
20050629-01 .html.
299. OAS, Support for Nicaragua, AG/DEC. 43 (XXV-O/05) (June 7, 2005). That same
month, the National Assembly replaced government-appointed directors of some public-service
organizations with its own selections; Bolafios responded by refusing to let them take their
positions. See Nicaragua President Rejects OAS Proposal on Political Crisis, PEOPLE'S DAILY
ONLINE (P.R.C.), June 19, 2005, http://english.people.com.cn/200506/19/eng20050619_191091.
html.
300. Support for Nicaragua, supra note 299, pmbl; see also id. I ("[The General Assembly
declares] [i]ts concern regarding the situation that gravely affects the democratic system in
Nicaragua.").
301. Id. 1 3; see also Veldzquez Sevilla & Uriarte, supra note 297.
302. Support for Nicaragua, supra note 299, 4.
303. See Press Release, OAS, OAS Names Former Argentinean Foreign Minister To Lead
Special Mission to Nicaragua (June 28, 2005); Press Release, OAS, OAS Reiterates Need for
Broad Dialogue in Nicaragua (June 21, 2005); Press Release, OAS, OAS Secretary General Goes
to Nicaragua Wednesday (June 14, 2005); see also Veldzquez Sevilla & Uriarte, supra note 297.
2008]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
A summit of the Central American Presidents issued a statement in July
2005 condemning what they called actions by the legislature that seri-
ously undermined democracy in Nicaragua.3" The Central American
presidents simply ignored the Nicaraguan Supreme Court's ruling and
called for the prompt reinstatement of the balance of powers by comply-
ing with the CCJ's judgment.3 °5 The European Union also issued a
statement in July 2005 expressing concern about the institutional crisis
in Nicaragua and its effect on "the rule of law ... and the balance and
independence of the powers of the state.
30 6
In September 2005 the Assembly took further action against Bola-
fios's presidency, stripping the Interior Minister and six other officials of
their legal immunity, based on claims that they had been involved in
campaign finance violations in the 2001 election. 30 7 Bolafios's govern-
ment characterized the Assembly's actions as a "threat to democracy...
coming from an unholy alliance of a legislature and a judiciary trying to
overthrow a freely and democratically elected president."308 It described
this "new paradigm"-the legislative and judicial branches attacking the
presidency-as calling for the same kind of vigorous response that the
international community would have to a president shutting down the
courts and the legislature.30 9 The OAS Secretary-General deplored what
he called "the judicialization of politics," which, he said, "inevitably
makes a country ungovernable, by generating endless conflicts. ' 310 Cit-
ing the Inter-American Democratic Charter, the OAS Permanent Coun-
cil issued a resolution in September 2005 saying that "the country's
democratic governance, the legitimate exercise of power, and the rule of
law" were under threat.311 That same month the Nicaraguan Foreign
Minister appeared before the UN General Assembly to reiterate the
304. See Luis Felipe Palacios, Presidentes demandan cumplir fallo de la CCJ, LA PRENSA
(Nicar.), July 1, 2005, http://www-usa.laprensa.com.ni/archivo/2005/julio/O1/poliica/politica-
20050701-01.html.
305. See id.
306. Press Release, UK Presidency of the EU 2005, Declaration by the Presidency on Behalf
of the European Union Concerning the Situation in Nicaragua (July 8, 2005), available at http:II
www.eu2005.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=
1107293561746&a=KArticle&aid=1119520253175&date=2005-07-08. Conservatives in the
United States adopted the cause as well. See, e.g., Help Nicaraguan Democrats Block "Creeping
Coup," HERrrAGE FouND. REP., Nov. 7, 2005 (depicting proposed constitutional amendments as
attempt to install one-party Sandinista rule).




310. Press Release, OAS, OAS Secretary General Reiterates Need for Dialogue in Nicaragua
(Sept. 29, 2005); see also Press Release, OAS, Statement of OAS Secretary General on
Developments in Nicaragua (Sept. 23, 2005).
311. Press Release, OAS, OAS Adopts Resolution in Support of Nicaragua (Sept. 9, 2005).
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claim that the FSLN-Liberal leaders were attempting to "upset the bal-
ance of power, an essential principal [sic] of representative democracy
in the Inter-American system." This effort, he said, was being made by
"joint forces opposing democracy," who had "escalat[ed] the breakdown
of constitutional order."
31 2
The United States issued its own condemnations as well. In Octo-
ber 2005 the United States threatened to suspend $175 million in aid and
revoke $4 billion in debt forgiveness, saying that what it called a "creep-
ing coup" was threatening democracy in Nicaragua.31 3 In its Country
Reports on Human Rights for 2005 (released in March 2006) the U.S.
Department of State accused the Nicaraguan Supreme Court of simply
"ignor[ing] the constitutional principle of separation of powers" when it
ruled in favor of the Assembly.31 4
In the end, the president and the Assembly reached an agreement
on a "framework law" providing that the constitutional amendments lim-
iting the president's power would not become effective until after the
next election, at which point the government would have the opportunity
to reconsider them.31" The Sandinista candidate and former President
Daniel Ortega subsequently won office by a plurality.316 Early on, the
new government exercised its power to suspend implementation of the
amendments pending further study.3 17 Ironically, the immediate out-
come-preserving the president's power-was precisely the result
toward which international pressure was directed, though it worked in
favor of a new president whose candidacy had been anathema to the
United States.318
312. Norman Caldera Cardenal, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Nicaragua,
Statement at the General Debate of the 60th Session of the United Nations General Assembly
(Sept. 19, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/60/statements/nic050919eng.pdf.
Alleging a "coup d'etat in slow motion," two ministers who were stripped of their immunity also
filed a petition with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. See Kate Joynes, Ousted
Nicaraguan Ministers Appeal for OAS Support, WORLD MARKETS ANALYSIS, Sept. 30, 2005.
313. Duncan Campbell, U.S. Warns Millions in Aid at Risk if Nicaragua Ousts President,
GUARDIAN (UK), Oct. 6, 2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/intemational/story/0,, 1585703,00.html.
314. U.S. Dep't of State, Nicaragua: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2005,
§ 1(e) (Mar. 8, 2006), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61734.htm.
315. Postergan Ley Marco por un Aflo, EL NuEvo DIARIO (Nicar.), Jan. 19, 2007, http://
impreso.elnuevodiario.com.ni/2007/01/19/politica/39202; see also Marion Barbel, Congress
Delays Presidential Power-Reduction Reform in Nicaragua, GLOBAL INSIGHT, Jan. 22, 2007; Kate
Joynes, Congress of Nicaragua Prepares Constitutional Reform, GLOBAL INSIGHT, Feb. 19, 2007.
316. Daniel Ortega es el vencedor, segdn Etica y Transparencia, EL NUEVO DIARIO (Nicar.),
Nov. 6, 2006, http://impreso.elnuevodiario.com.ni/2006/11/06/politica/33222; see also James C.
McKinley Jr., Rival's Concession Clears Way for Ortega, Once and Future President of
Nicaragua, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2006, at A10.
317. See Postergan Ley Marco por un Aflo, supra note 315.
318. The Pact had varied fortuntes after Ortega's election. One constant was efforts to reshape
the form of the government. See, e.g., Nicaragua: Proposals To Change Style of Government,
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B. The Togolese Constitutional Crisis of 2005: Limits on
Constitutional Amendment
On February 5, 2005, Gnassingb6 Eyad6ma, who had been presi-
dent of Togo since 1967, died.319 His son Faur6 Gnassingb6 was sworn
in two days later as president with the backing of the military. 320 This
action did not appear particularly consistent with the Togo's Constitu-
tion. Article 65 of the Togolese Constitution called for the president of
the National Assembly to exercise the functions of the presidency for
sixty days, at the end of which there should be an election for
president.321
Whether the incident was one in which democracy was "abruptly
brought to an end, '322 in the terms used by ECOWAS's Protocol on
Democracy and Good Governance, might be open to question. President
Gnassingb6 had ruled for some years under democratic form, but only
after taking power decades earlier in a coup. His government, moreover,
was widely considered undemocratic. The son's accession was gener-
ally viewed as either the start of a family dynasty or the effort by the
military to rule from behind the scenes or both.
What is interesting is the characterization that regional and interna-
tional actors employed in objecting to the son's accession. The U.S.
Department of State called it "an unconstitutional move. 323 ECOWAS
called it a "violation of the [Togolese] Constitution 324 and imposed
sanctions. The OAU termed it a "blatant and unacceptable violation of
CARIBBEAN & CENT. AM. REP., Oct. 18, 2007 (noting talks between FSLN and PLC over possible
constitutional amendments to create a parliamentary form of government with a prime minister).
In January 2008, after another ruling by the Nicaraguan Supreme Court-this one invalidating the
framework law that had suspended the constitutional amendments-President Ortega stated that
the resulting reduction in presidential power was a useful "step towards creating a parliamentary
system." New Laws Suggest Revival of Pact, LAT. AM. REGIONAL REP., Jan. 2008, at 7 (quoting
Ortega); see also id. (noting critics' assertions that Ortega's interest in parliamentary government
stems from a desire to stay in power after his presidential term expires).
319. For more detailed accounts of the crisis, see Stephen J. Schnably, The OAS and
Constitutionalism: Lessons from Recent West African Experience, 33 SYR. J. Lr-r'L L. & COM.
263, 267-74 (2005), and see also KANIYE S.A. EBEKU, THE SUCCESSION OF FAURE GNASSING3E
TO THE TOGOLESE PRESIDENCY: AN INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE (2005), and Muthoni
Kamuyu, Togo, in STRATEGIES FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGE 49-76 (Ted Piccone & Richard Youngs
eds., 2006).
320. Schnably, supra note 319, at 267-69.
321. Toco CONST. art. 65 ("In case of a vacancy of the Presidency of the Republic due to
death, resignation or definitive incapacity, the presidential function shall be temporarily exercised
by the President of the National Assembly."); see also id. ("The Government shall convoke the
electorate within sixty (60) days of the opening of the vacancy for the election of a new President
of the Republic.").
322. See Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, supra note 212, art. 45(1).
323. U.S. Dep't of State, Background Note: Togo, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5430.htm
(last visited Jan. 27, 2008).
324. Press Release, ECOWAS Salutes the Memory of President Eyadema, Condemns the
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the Togolese Constitution," 325 citing the Lom6 Declaration, and sus-
pended participation of the government in OAU proceedings.
ECOWAS, as noted earlier, had already proclaimed its intolerance
for "power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means."3 26 And
the AU had made a commitment to take action in response to "an uncon-
stitutional change" of government. 327 Still, the charge that Togo's gov-
ernment had acted unconstitutionally is striking precisely because it so
firmly rejects the notion that interpretation of the constitution is a matter
for domestic legal authorities. It is a long way from the concern
expressed nearly four decades earlier when Article 46 of the Vienna
Convention was drafted that interpretation of one state's constitution by
another would constitute interference in the former's domestic affairs. 8
It might be thought relevant that the disregard for the constitution
was particularly blatant. It is worth noting, however, that the military
asserted that the imperative security needs made the son's accession as
president consistent with the constitution. The president of the National
Assembly was in France when Gnassingbd Eyad6ma died, and was una-
ble to return to Togo immediately. To respond that this argument is
obviously wrong in light of the text of Article 65 (or even to point out
that the military's decision to seal the country's borders upon the presi-
dent's death prevented the Assembly's president from returning) is
already to venture into the realm of constitutional interpretation. It is
not entirely implausible that a state of emergency would arise when a
president who has ruled autocratically for decades dies in office.3 2 9 My
point is not that application of some kind of state necessity doctrine to
the circumstances would necessarily be a correct interpretation of the
Togolese constitution. It is simply that whether to apply it amounts to
an interpretation-one not that is necessarily different in principle from
claims made by U.S. presidents of inherent executive power.
In any case, the Togolese government quickly made matters more
interesting-and difficult for the international actors condemning the
move. The son resigned and was immediately elected by the National
Violation of the Constitution and Calls for a Return to Constitutional Order (Feb. 5, 2005); see
also Communique, ECOWAS, On the Situation in Togo, Cotonou (Feb. 1i, 2005).
325. Communiqud of the Twenty-fourth Meeting of the African Union, Peace and Security
Council (Part B), On the Situation in Togo, AU PSC/PR/Comm. (XXIV), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
(Feb. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Communique, On the Situation in Togo].
326. Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, supra note 212, art. 1(c).
327. Lomd Declaration, supra note 178.
328. See supra text accompanying notes 71-81.
329. See EBEKU, supra note 319, at 18-21 (discussing Nigerian, Cypriot, and Pakistani judicial
rulings applying doctrines of state necessity to justify extraordinary action when the state's basic
security is threatened).
20081
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Assembly (firmly in the control of the ruling party) as its president.33 °
His election as the Assembly's president now made him eligible at least
to exercise the powers of the presidency for sixty days. But the Assem-
bly did not stop with this move. It also used its power under Article 144
of the constitution to amend Article 65 to provide that in the case of a
vacancy, the Assembly's president would simply become president and
complete the late president's term (due to end in 2008). With this
amendment, it might appear that the succession now avoided the prohi-
bition on unconstitutional changes in government.
Nevertheless, ECOWAS called the action an "illegal amendment"
to the constitution. 331 The actions that led to the son's second accession
to the presidency were, in ECOWAS's terms, pure and simple "manipu-
lations of the Constitution by the National Assembly," a "cover-up" for
a "coup d'etat. '332 ECOWAS proceeded to impose sanctions, even
when the new President said he would call elections in sixty days.33 3 On
what basis could an international organization reach such a conclusion?
Not surprisingly, ECOWAS did not provide the kind of detailed
reasoning one would expect from a court. But certain factors stand out.
One is a sense that the legislature simply rubber-stamped the military
initiative. This concern could lead one to conclude that the amendment
may have been valid in form, but was still somehow a sham. The other
is the text of the Togo Constitution itself. Article 144 does provide for
amendment if four-fifths of the members of the National Assembly
approve the proposed amendment, as happened here. 334  But it also
places two limitations on the amendment power. The first relates to tim-
ing and procedure. -The President must co-sponsor any proposed amend-
ment, which is not possible when there is a vacancy in the presidency,
and in fact Article 144 expressly states, "No procedure for revision can
330. Schnably, supra note 319, at 267-70.
331. Press Release, ECOWAS Holds Extraordinary Meeting on the Situation in Togo (Feb. 8,
2005) ("In violation of the Togolese Constitution, following its illegal amendment, Faure
Gnassingb6, son of the late president, was designated to succeed his father.").
332. Final Communiqud, ECOWAS, Extraordinary Summit of the Heads of State and
Government, Niamey (Feb. 9, 2005), para. 5.
333. Id. para. 6; see also Communiqu6 Issued by the Current Chairman ECOWAS (Mamadou
Tandja, President of the Republic of Niger and Chairman of the Authority of Heads of State and
Government of ECOWAS) (Feb. 18, 2005); Communiqu6, On the Situation in Togo, supra note
325; Press Release, Org. of African Unity, Press Release No. 02/2005 (Feb. 19, 2005), available
at www.africa-union.org/NewsEvents/Press-Releases/19%202005%2OTogo%20-%20%20eng.
pdf ("The Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union (AU), Alpha Oumar Konar6,
continues to follow developments in the situation in Togo, particularly in the light of the
declaration by Mr. Faur6 Gnassingb6 confirming his decision to remain in power, and this in
violation of the Togolese Constitution and the pertinent AU and ECOWAS decisions.").
334. Alternatively, a proposed amendment may be submitted to a referendum under certain
circumstances.
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be engaged in or pursued during an interim period or a vacancy or when
the integrity of the territory is being violated." The presidency was of
course vacant upon Gnassingb6 Eyadrma's death. Even the election of
his son as president of the Assembly would not seem to have changed
this: the original Article 65 merely called on the president of the assem-
bly to exercise the functions of the presidency.
The second limitation is substantive. Article 144 limits the kinds of
uses to which the amending power can be put. In particular, it prohibits
any amendments that would revise the "Republican form of the State."
Perhaps this means that an amendment that legitimized a family dynasty
would be incompatible with a republican form of the state. If so, there
would be a substantive irregularity even though the amendment received
the necessary four-fifths vote of the Assembly.
A judgment that the use of the amendment power to change the
Togolese constitution was itself inconsistent with the Constitution is
thus by no means difficult to understand. The AU Peace & Security
Council could be read as taking this approach, since it "firmly con-
demn[ed] the revision of the Togolese Constitution made by the de facto
authorities, in violation of the relevant provisions of the Togolese Con-
stitution." '335 But the simple fact that the amendments to the constitution
were done in a manner inconsistent with the text of Article 144 does not
settle the question, for two reasons. First, there is always the question
whether a constitution may be amended in ways not contemplated by-
or even prohibited by-its textual provisions on amendment. Second,
and more to the point, the Togolese legislature also amended Article 144
to eliminate the prohibition on amendments while the presidency is
vacant.336
Was the elimination on this prohibition valid? The question is not
unique to Togo. Article V of the U.S. Constitution prohibits the use of
the amending power to deprive a state of its equal suffrage in the Senate
without its consent. An amendment limiting representation of small
states in the Senate to one each would be inconsistent with this substan-
tive limit, even though its enactment followed all the proper procedures.
But does Article V prohibit the use of the amending power to eliminate
this restriction on the amending power, in the same or an earlier
amendment?
The lack of any real commitment to democracy and the rule of law
in Togo for many decades is obvious ground for suspecting that the mili-
335. Communiqu6, On the Situation in Togo, supra note 325.
336. This change would not address the issue of the republican form of government, but the
legislature's action could be understood as representing a judgment that a son's accession to the
presidency through constitutional means is not in itself contrary to republicanism.
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tary and its allies in the Togolese National Assembly were engaging in
careful lawyering aimed at the international community rather than seek-
ing to revise the Constitution in good faith to respond to a pressing prob-
lem. Still, when other states and international organizations dismiss as
manipulation the utmost attention to the basic legal text-including its
provisions for amendment-they have a taken a particularly strong (and
contestable) stance on the relevance of motivation to constitutional inter-
pretation. What might seem a simple command to a state-that it be
faithful to whatever constitutional text it has (including its provisions for
amendment)-turns out almost immediately to enmesh international
actors in deeply substantive questions of constitutional interpretation
and methodology.
In any case, with the United States, France, the U.N. Secretary
General, ECOWAS, and AU all condemning the son's accession, and
with ECOWAS and AU threatening isolation and sanctions, the
Togolese authorities backed down. The new president resigned and the
amendments were nullified. The vice-president of the Assembly, Abass
Bonfoh, was named its president, and thus qualified to exercise the pow-
ers of the presidency. Subsequently there was a presidential election,
which the former president's son won amid widespread claims of voter
fraud and violent suppression of demonstrations.337
Interestingly, even in the period between the resignation of the
president's son and his subsequent election to the presidency interna-
tional actors found themselves deeply enmeshed in constitutional ques-
tions. After meeting with government and opposition figures soon after
the president's son resigned, ECOWAS announced that the election
would be held within the sixty-day time period mandated by the consti-
tution. The date it announced, however, was not sixty days after Febru-
ary 5, 2005, when Gnassingb6 Eyad6ma had died, but sixty days after
February 26, 2005, when Bonfoh assumed the powers of the presidency
after Faurd Gnassingb6's resignation under international pressure. By
treating the vacancy as having begun at this point, ECOWAS might
appear to have accorded some legitimacy to Faur6 Gnassingb6's brief
period in office under the amended constitution. ECOWAS's action
may have been reasonable, of course; the opposition wanted as much
time as possible to organize for the upcoming election. But by specifi-
cally referring to "the 60 days Interim period prescribed by the Constitu-
tion of Togo in article 65," ECOWAS engaged in constitutional
interpretation in a very concrete way.
Second, Article 62 of the Constitution bans anyone from running
for the presidency if he or she "does not reside in the national territory
337. Schnably, supra note 319, at 270.
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for at least twelve (12) months." Added in 2002, this provision elimi-
nated Gilchrist Olympio from the contest. The son of Togo's first presi-
dent, Olympio had been in exile in France since 1992 when he escaped
an attempt by the government to assassinate him. It was striking that
Faur6 Gnassingb6, who had just been deeply enmeshed in what might
have seemed an unconstitutional change of government, was not barred
from running, whereas an opposition candidate could be banned by an
amendment approved by a National Assembly thoroughly dominated by
government forces and, one would suspect, fully aware of the effect of
their action. On this matter, ECOWAS took no action, and Olympio
was barred from running. Once again, ECOWAS's stance may have
been reasonable. My point is simply that a choice to treat such a provi-
sion as fully binding is to take a deeply substantive stance on the validity
of constitutional amendments.
III. EVALUATING THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS
TO STRUCTURAL CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
In the end, some internationalization of structural constitutional
issues may be both unavoidable and even desirable. The ultimate viola-
tion of a constitution is a military coup, and one might think twice about
returning to the days when coups were considered purely internal mat-
ters. While Togo's crisis ended with a questionable election putting the
president's son in power, the fact that the government encountered some
limits on its ability to shape the constitution to its immediate needs
might prove useful to democracy over the long run.
At the same time the internationalization of matters of constitu-
tional structure also poses significant risks to democracy itself. Nations
are still the main arena in which democratic institutions are situated.
And one major expression of democracy is the working out of the mean-
ing of the country's constitution in every day politics and even in key
constitutional turning points or "moments. 338 Precisely because consti-
tutional issues are structural, they may in turn have a profound impact
on the shape of politics in the future. External intervention into or influ-
ence on these matters, pervasive in both Nicaragua and Togo,3 39 is not
necessarily democratic. 4 °
338. See Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J.
1013, 1022-23 (1984); ACKERMAN, supra note 4.
339. See Prez-Baltodano, supra note 234, at 18, 21-22; Ortega Hegg, supra note 257, at
9-10; Kamuyu, supra note 319.
340. Cf. Rubenfeld, supra note 31, at 2012 ("International constitutionalism ... does damage
to the prospects for variation, experimentation, and pluralism that national democracy opens up.");
see also, e.g., Kamuyu, supra note 319, at 70 (noting that "French interests are more in line with
supporting the status quo rather than supporting Togo's transition to democracy").
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To be sure, external intervention might help support internal
democracy in some ways. One obvious parallel is international human
rights law itself. It does involve some compromise of national auton-
omy and sovereignty, but this compromise is easier to accept because
although it limits democracy it also supports it in important respects.
For example, international pressure to respect freedom of expression and
association may help preserve or open up space for domestic opposition
groups. International election observers-in support of the right to
vote-may help ensure that elections are not rigged. Even the very fact
of the international community's espousal of human rights norms may
give moral support to domestic groups seeking to end government
abuses.
Similarly, international pressure to maintain a balance of powers
and respect for the constitution could, in theory, help preserve the possi-
bility of genuinely democratic politics in a particular country. One
should not be too sanguine about this possibility, though. As between
legislatures and executives, it is executives who participate most actively
in the international arena. If there is any general bias here, it might be
that internationalizing structural constitutional issues could generally
favor the executive branch. The declaration of the heads of Central
American states in support of Bolafios is one example. And of course in
the domestic arena executives often play leading roles in interpreting
and implementing international law.3 41
Another potential problem can be gleaned from the very fact that
the events described in Part II related to two small countries with limited
resources. While the norms, being general, would apply to all states, in
practice genuine international enforcement pressure is likely to be
exerted only on less powerful countries. Moreover, more powerful
countries would seem unlikely to attempt to take principled stands on
these issues. While the United States expressed strong concern about
the shift toward legislature power embodied in the proposed Nicaraguan
amendments, for example, it earlier took the opposite stand in dealing
with Aristide after restoring him to power following the coup in 1991.
The United States constantly pressed Aristide to work with the legisla-
ture. The claim was that a stronger legislature would be better for
democracy, but it is hard not to imagine that the United States also wel-
comed any constraint on Aristide, with whom it had significant policy
disagreements. 342 A complaint of hypocrisy, however, would assume
341. See Michael Kirby, International Law-The Impact on National Constitutions, 21 Am. U.
INT'L L. REV. 327, 350-51 (2006); Tom Ginsburg, Locking in Democracy: Constitutions,
Commitment, and International Law, 38 N.Y.U. J. Irr' L. & POL. 707, 741-42 (2006). On the
declaration of the heads of Central American states, see supra text accompanying note 304.
342. See Schnably, supra note 128, at 194-96.
[Vol. 62:417
EMERGING INTERNATIONAL LAW CONSTRAINTS
that a consistent position was not only desirable but also possible. Yet
questions of balance are highly contextual. The widespread perception
that the FSLN had been given control of the courts in Nicaragua, for
example, could have a major impact on one's assessment of the balance
of powers. Questions about how soon the subsequent elections were
required to be held under the Togolese constitution could depend, in
part, on one's assessment of how realistic it would be for the opposition
to mount a credible campaign within a short period of time.
Avoiding the risks simply by proclaiming constitutional matters to
be purely internal-or by attempting to limit the application of the inter-
national norms only to the most extreme cases-may not be possible.
States' participation in a larger international system is likely to make
either alternative difficult. While there are obvious differences between
the international order and a federal system, the example of the U.S.
Constitution itself as an attempt to maintain at least somewhat autono-
mous units within a larger system may still be instructive. To a large
extent, the Constitution does not specify the internal structure of state
governments. There is no general requirement that states maintain the
same kind of separation of powers laid out in the Constitution for the
federal government.343 Nor do standing or other Article III limitations
on federal courts apply to state courts. The underlying premise is that
choice in the structure of government flows from whatever degree of
sovereignty states retained with the creation of the Union. As the
Supreme Court put it in Gregory v. Ashcroft, "[t]hrough the structure of
its government ... a State defines itself as a sovereign." 3"
Two things stand out about this arrangement. The first is that pris-
tine separation turns out not to be possible even in the Constitution
itself. One can see glimpses of a more robust role for the Constitution in
matters of state constitutional structure. Most obviously, Article IV,
Section 4 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he United States shall
guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Govern-
ment." One could indeed analogize the international commitments to
democracy, constitutionalism, and separation of powers to this clause.34 5
But there other provisions that may be even more specific as well. Arti-
343. See Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 225 (1908) ("[W]hen ... a state
Constitution sees fit to unite legislative and judicial powers in a single hand, there is nothing to
hinder so far as the Constitution of the United States is concerned.").
344. 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991). There is also a functional aspect as well: If states are to be
democratic, they should have the power to structure their own governments and create or revise
their own constitutions. This power is, of course, subject to specific constitutional limitations-
for example, the Fourteenth Amendment-but this constraint is not too different in principle from
the binding character of human rights treaties on states that ratify them.
345. E.g., Morton H. Halperin & Kristen Lomasney, Toward a Global "Guarantee Clause," J.
DEMOC., July 1993, at 60, 60.
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cle IV itself contains what looks like a very specific separation of pow-
ers requirement. The United States is obligated to protect states from
"domestic Violence" upon "Application of the Legislature, or of the
Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened). 3"6 This provi-
sion specifies a particular role for the legislative and executive branches
on a particular issue. The same is true of state ratification of proposed
amendments. If Congress does not specify the use of state conventions,
then it is state legislatures-not state governors-that have the power to
decide whether the state will approve the amendment.3 47 Article II
might be read to have its own state separation of powers requirements.
In Bush v. Gore three justices of the Supreme Court read Article II,
Section 1, Clause 2 to impose a specific separation of powers require-
ment on states in the exercise of their power to determine the manner in
which electors were chosen-a requirement to be policed by the federal
courts.3 48 It was, the concurrence reasoned, for the Florida legislature to
make that determination; in the view of the concurrence, the Florida
Supreme Court had usurped that authority.349
The other notable feature of this arrangement is the way it veers so
easily from practical insignificance to extreme intrusiveness. The Guar-
antee Clause is functionally a dead letter. The political question doctrine
essentially precludes the courts from enforcing it,350 and there is little if
any sign that it plays any role in politics. As for Article V, in Coleman
v. Miller,35' the Court was evenly divided on the justiciability of the
question whether Kansas's lieutenant governor was part of the legisla-
ture under Article V. Had it ruled on the issue, it would appear to have
had two choices: treat the Kansas Supreme Court's ruling that the Kan-
sas constitution permitted the lieutenant governor to cast a tie-breaking
vote3 2 as essentially determining the Article V question,353 or engage in
a detailed analysis of Kansas's constitutional arrangements and their
compatibility with Article V.
The same dichotomy can be seen in Bush v. Gore. The effort by
Chief Justice Rehnquist to take on intra-state separation of powers issues
was notable for the degree of its potential intrusiveness into state affairs.
It amounted to a view that the federal courts should impose their own
346. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
347. Id. art. V.
348. 531 U.S. 98, 112-13 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring).
349. Id. at 114.
350. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 39-40 (1849).
351. 307 U.S. 433, 446-47 (1939).
352. Coleman v. Miller, 71 P.2d 518, 519-24 (Kan. 1937).
353. See Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the
Amendment Process, 97 HARV. L. REv. 386, 426 n.196 (1983).
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vision of the proper role of courts in interpreting statutes-their own
stance on "judicial activism"-on states.354 In sharp contrast was Jus-
tice Stevens's view that no more than an assumption that the Florida
Supreme Court had acted impartially was needed to eliminate any "col-
orable federal question." '355 Similarly, Justice Ginsburg argued that
there was no basis in Article II for "federal superintendence over the
relationship between state courts and legislatures." '356
The absence of any obvious middle ground between complete def-
erence and robust intervention is highly suggestive for the international
level as well. Once we take the first step on the international level-
treating the complete disruption of a constitutional structure as a proper
subject of international intervention-we may be set on a path that poses
its own dangers to the democratic governance the intervention seeks to
protect. Almost any internationalization of these issues is likely to draw
international actors into the most detailed and basic questions of consti-
tutional law in particular countries-as the experience of the Togolese
and Nicaraguan constitutional crises shows. One cannot easily confine
the international law norms to questions about executive power; nor can
one easily confine it to setting some broad parameters while allowing
variation from country to country on details.
What makes it even more difficult is that one cannot even take for
granted what the proper text is. In Nicaragua, from the perspective of
the National Assembly and the Supreme Court, it was (before the Fall
2005 agreement) the text with the new amendments; to the President and
a regional court with an arguable claim to jurisdiction, it was the text
without the amendments. In Togo, the text was, from the perspective of
the Assembly and the President, the text with the amendments; from the
perspective of ECOWAS and the AU, it was the text without the
amendments.
Nor are questions about what constitutes the text issues that arise
only in less established constitutional systems, likely to disappear as a
state gains more of a constitutional tradition. Is the Twenty-seventh
Amendment-which bans Congress from "varying the compensation"
for its members "until an election of Representatives shall have inter-
vened"-part of the U.S. Constitution? With state ratifications spanning
an interval of some two hundred years, did the amendment have the
approval of the requisite number of states over a period that was "suffi-
354. See Robert A. Schapiro, Conceptions and Misconceptions of State Constitutional Law in
Bush v. Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 661, 677-83 (2001).
355. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
356. Id. at 141 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). She also concluded, however, that the reference in
the Guarantee Clause itself to a "Republican Form of Government" specifically supported-one
might wonder, required?-a role for state courts in the construction of state laws. Id.
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ciently contemporaneous ... to reflect the will of the people ... at
relatively the same period"?3 57 Does the fact that the legislative branch
approved resolutions accepting the amendment settle the matter?
35 8
Does the fact that the executive branch took the position that the amend-
ment was valid settle it?35 9 Is either fact even relevant? 360 Both stand-
ing limitations and the political question doctrine may well preclude the
possibility of any definitive judicial holding on these and related
questions.36'
To summarize: The dilemma is that any international enforcement
of constraints on structures of democracy-on issues like checks and
balances and separation of powers-may both support and undermine
democracy. There is no doubt that purely domestic political struggles
can end with fatal results for a constitution or even the culture that sup-
ports constitutionalism; and just as international human rights norms and
their enforcement can potentially tip the outcome in favor of respect for
human rights, so international enforcement pressure might help preserve
a country's commitment to constitutionalism. But these very enforce-
ment pressures threaten, as a practical matter, to give other countries a
new and fairly intrusive basis for intervening into other countries'
affairs. This power to intervene is likely to be exercised in ways that are
beneficial to the more powerful states. But even if that turned out not to
be so, international pressures are not subject to democratic
accountability.362
While this dilemma is real, it may be helpful to place it in more
general perspective. First, in neither Togo nor Nicaragua does the
degree of intervention appear to have been, as a practical matter, terribly
357. Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 375 (1921).
358. See 138 CONG. REC. S6948 (daily ed. May 20, 1992) (Senate); 138 CONG. REc. H3505
(daily ed. May 20, 1992) (House).
359. 16 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 87, 105 (1992).
360. For a useful history and analysis, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of
Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677
(1993).
361. See id. at 680-81 (noting difficulties that standing doctrine may create for any judicial
determination of the status of the amendment); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 456 (1939)
(rejecting challenge to Kansas's apparent ratification of the proposed Child Labor Amendment on
political question grounds).
362. For one articulation of this concern, see Rubenfeld, supra note 31, at 2017-18. The
OAU's 1999 Algiers Declaration, supra note 170, is notable for linking the internationalization of
structural constitutional issues to a call for a "genuine democratisation of international relations
based on the active participation and a balanced consideration of the legitimate concerns of all
nations." But obviously this call only highlights the problem. At the level of the nation-state
there is at least a possibility that struggles over the interpretation and revision of a constitution
will take place within a democratic politics marked by some real accountability on the part of
major actors. The same cannot currently be said about pressure exerted from the outside by other
states and international organizations.
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effective in changing anything. Faur6 Gnassingb6 ended up in the office
to which the military had initially elevated him, following an election
that was hardly a model for democracy. In Nicaragua the United States'
expressed concerns about a creeping coup were part of a process that
turned out to help preserve the powers of a presidency subsequently
assumed by Daniel Ortega. The potential for greater intrusiveness may
be real, but these two examples do not suggest that intervention into
constitutional matters is the most attractive way for more powerful states
to influence affairs in other states.363
Second, utter rejection of any move toward their internationaliza-
tion of structural constitutional issues would not mean that determina-
tion of each country's governmental structure would be reserved to a
domestic arena pristinely free of any international influences. There are
many respects in which issues of governmental structure are already
subject to transnational and international influences or even constraints.
I will briefly discuss a few factors.
One factor is the trend toward the disaggregation of the state and
the increasing tendency of officials and agencies of the government to
interact with their counterparts in other governments. These interactions
may take place through a state's membership in an international organi-
zation or through informal global or regional networks of interested offi-
cials.3 64 Either way, regulatory officials, judges, and legislators from
different states can meet, share concerns and information, and give each
other formal and informal support.
One obvious impact of this trend relates to policy formation.
Cross-border interaction of judges may, for example, promote "constitu-
tional cross-fertilization." '365 Regulators may work with their counter-
parts from other countries to harmonize standards. 36 6 An international
organization may influence the course of policy in a particular state by
providing intellectual and technical resources to agencies or individuals
within the government interested in promoting policies backed by the
363. Nor, of course, do even powerful states have unlimited resources at their disposal to bring
to bear on other states' politics. Cf. Ludwin Lodisiga L6pez & Luis Felipe Palacios, Fuerza
pdblica apoyara fallo CCJ, LA PRENSA (Nicar.), Mar. 31, 2005, http://Iaprensa.com.ni/archivo/
2005/marzo/31/nacionales/nacionales-20050331-04.html (noting Sandinista legislator's ironic
inquiry into whether the United States was planning to withdraw forces from Iraq in order to
invade Nicaragua in support of Bolafios).
364. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 152-62 (2004) [hereinafter
SLAUGHTER, New WORLD ORDER]; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Government Networks: The Heart of
the Liberal Democratic Order, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 128, at 199.
365. SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 364, at 69-79.
366. Id. at 59-61.
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international organization.36 7 Developments of this sort might herald
one kind of impact on domestic governmental structures at a very basic
level. If sovereignty is being transformed from something grounded in
the individual autonomy of isolated states to an expression of their mem-
bership in a global order,368 the very notion of constitutions as expres-
sing a state's unique history, politics, values, and aspirations might be
endangered (or rendered irrelevant). The structures set up by a constitu-
tion would need to conform to global technical and political imperatives;
a state's fundamental governmental framework, that is, would need to be
one that best facilitated its "participation in the various regimes that reg-
ulate and order the international system. '369 And that might turn out to
look very much alike for all countries participating in the global arena.
In the most extreme version, concern for any national structural constitu-
tional issues would be relegated to a distinct second place after concern
for how the global order and its organizations were structured.
At a less abstract (and more current) level, informal networking and
interaction with international organizations may have a profound impact
on any given country's governmental structure. International organiza-
tions may, for example, provide crucial assistance in helping interested
regulators or policy makers to build up institutions within their own gov-
ernment to advocate, formulate, and implement policies that interest
international organizations.37 °  Judicial cross-fertilization might
empower or embolden a judiciary in a particular country, shifting the
balance of power away somewhat from the political branches. Harmoni-
zation efforts might promote the power of regulatory agencies at the
expense of elected officials. The internationalization of certain areas of
law (whether through treaty or other means) may shift power toward the
executive, who tends to be the predominant actor in the international
arena.37 In turn, the ebb and flow of powers within a government may
well have an impact over time on how constitutional structures are inter-
preted. The consistent exercise of powers by a branch of government
may, for example, come to be taken as an historical gloss on the
constitution.
The rise of disaggregation and informal networks is by no means
367. See Jost E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 618-19 (2005).
368. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995); see also SLAUGHTER, NEW
WORLD ORDER, supra note 364, at 266-71; Bengt Jacobsson, Regulated Regulators: Global
Trends of State Transformation, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF
REGULATION 205 (Marie-Laure Djelic & Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson eds., 2006).
369. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 368, at 27.
370. See ALVAREZ, supra note 367, at 618-20.
371. See id. at 619.
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the only development on the international level that would likely con-
tinue to subject structural constitutional issues to some degree of interna-
tionalization even in the absence of any legal norms on the subject.
Anti-corruption or transparency initiatives can easily be linked to
democracy. The preamble to the Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption asserts that "representative democracy ...requires, by its
nature, the combating of every form of corruption in the performance of
public functions. 372 As one commentator argues:
The principle of rule of law encompasses within its understanding a
scrupulous adherence to law, rules and regulations of the legal system
so that government remains accountable to the people.... Corrup-
tion violates the foundational principles of rule of law because gov-
ernment decisions are no longer based on law, but rather on factors
extraneous to the law.373
Anti-corruption treaties may have an impact on issues of constitutional
structure by requiring independence on the part of agencies dealing with
it. 3 74 Requirements of public reporting and transparency 375 complement
the notion of constitutional fidelity by committing states to use decision-
making processes that follow stated laws and policies, potentially rein-
forcing the kind of respect for the rule of law that undergirds a commit-
ment to constitutions. In addition, states may find themselves pressed to
institute stronger guarantees of prosecutorial or judicial independence,
or modify guarantees of parliamentary immunity, to put themselves in a
position to comply with the obligations they take on.3 76 They may also
find themselves grappling with conflicts between their own existing sep-
aration of powers doctrines and efforts to fight corruption.377 Changes
372. Mar. 29 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724, 727 (1996).
373. C. Raj Kumar, Human Rights Approaches of Corruption Control Mechanisms-
Enhancing the Hong Kong Experience of Corruption Prevention Strategies, 5 SAN DIEGO INT'L
L.J. 323, 335 (2004); see also, e.g., Support for Nicaragua in the Fight Against Corruption, supra
note 114, 1 ("[T]he fight against corruption is an essential component of the exercise of
democracy, the consolidation of institutions, and the strengthening of the rule of law.").
374. E.g., United Nations Convention Against Corruption art. 6(2), Dec. 11, 2003, 43 I.L.M.
37, 40 (2004); see also African Union (AU): Convention on Preventing and Combating
Corruption art. 5(3), July 11, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 5, 8 (2004); James Thuo Gathii, Corruption and
Donor Reforms: Expanding the Promises and Possibilities of the Rule of Law as an Anti-
Corruption Strategy in Kenya, 14 CONN. J. INT'L L. 407, 436-37 (1999) (noting condition
imposed by International Monetary Fund in structural adjustment loan that Kenya create
independent agencies to fight corruption).
375. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, supra note 374, arts. 10, 13.
376. See, e.g., Peter W. Schroth & Ana Daniela Bostan, International Constitutional Law and
Anti-Corruption Measures in the European Union's Accession Negotiations: Romania in
Comparative Perspective, 52 Am. J. CoMp. L. 625, 674-87 (2004) (concerning prosecutorial and
judicial independence); David Morrissey, Note, The Fight Against Corruption by International
Organizations, 39 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 165, 192-95 (2007) (arguing for a reform in the
Paraguayan judiciary to fight corruption and to ensure democracy).
377. See, e.g., Peter W. Schroth, National and International Constitutional Law Aspects of
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of this sort can have a more general impact on the separation of
powers.378
In short, international legal norms regarding separation of powers
and constitutional fidelity should not be seen as treading on an area cur-
rently free of global influences. Indeed, they might simply be viewed as
a legal manifestation of those influences, though like any legal norms
they might in turn shape the forces that first gave rise to them. In any
event, it would be premature to arrive at any definitive verdict on the
desirability of the norms without placing them in this larger context.
Finally, does the apparent emergence of structural constitutional
issues as a subject of international law have any bearing on U.S. courts'
handling of the constitutional issues posed since September 11? As a
purely predictive matter, the answer may well be no. The Supreme
Court has shown little inclination in recent years to regard even treaties
protecting individual rights as judicially enforceable, an attitude shared
by the President and Congress.379
In one sense, there is little reason to fault the assumption that U.S.
courts should resolve structural constitutional issues without serious
engagement with any international legal rules or standards concerning
them. The impressive depth and breadth of the international caselaw
regarding individual human rights 380 offer insights and constructive con-
trasts that make it well worth consulting in any analysis of individual
rights issues. The same cannot be said for the emerging international
norms concerning structural constitutional issues. The United States has
African Treaties and Laws Against Corruption, 13 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 91-95
(2003).
378. Governance programs initiated by international agencies or states as a condition of loans
or aid may also have an impact. For a useful overview, see Ved P. Nanda, The "Good
Governance" Concept Revisited, 603 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 269 (2006).
379. The consistent U.S. practice of providing that human rights treaties it ratifies are to be
treated as non-self-executing by the courts is one example. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, U.S.
Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Brinker, 89 AMER. J. INT'L L.
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2844-45 (Thomas, Scalia & Alito, JJ., dissenting); see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33,
38-40 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (opinion joined by then Judge Roberts) (holding Geneva Conventions
non-self-executing), rev'd on other grounds, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2798. In its brief before the
Supreme Court in Hamdan the government urged the Court not to "take the radical step of
creating judicially enforceable rights" under the Conventions. Brief for Respondents at 9,
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-184). For a more recent example of the
Court's hesitance to find treaty obligations to be self-executing, see Medellfn v. Texas, No. 06-
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380. For one indication, see FRANcisco FORREST MAnRTI Er AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
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a rich constitutional tradition in comparison to which the regional and
international commitments to respect the separation of powers and
adherence to the constitution can seem impoverished.
If the content of these emerging norms has little to say to U.S.
courts, however, their existence tells another story. The international
commitments and exhortations to maintain some appropriate separation
of powers and fidelity to the constitution do not arise from nothing.
Increasingly given prominence by governments in international forums,
they represent a response to a real phenomenon: the undermining of
constitutional order not by blatant overthrow but by government actors
claiming to protect that order and the society of which it is a part. Faced
with expansive assertions of executive power since September 11, courts
might find it useful to consider the fundamental message of these emerg-
ing norms (or perhaps of the difficulties encountered in applying them).
Ruptures, by whatever name-interruption, disruption, unconstitutional
alteration-are not something entirely separate and apart from ordinary
constitutional practice. In the course of being interpreted or amended,
constitutions can be not only affirmed, reshaped, or revised. They can
also be broken.
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